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I. INTRODUCTION
Adam Stall downloaded and viewed child pornography for more than 
five years before the FBI uncovered the images of adult males raping
young girls on his computer.1  Some of the children were previously
identified victims of sexual abuse.2  The once-mandatory Federal Sentencing
1. United States v. Stall, 581 F.3d 276, 278 (6th Cir. 2009). 
2. Id.  The children were previously identified by the National Center for Missing 
and Exploited Children (NCMEC), which:
(A) serves as a national resource center and clearinghouse; (B) works in 
partnership with the Department of Justice, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the
United States Marshals Service, the Department of the Treasury, the
Department of State, the Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement,
the United States Secret Service, the United States Postal Inspection Service,
and many other agencies in the effort to find missing children and prevent child 
victimization; and (C) operates a national network, linking the Center online
with each of the missing children clearinghouses operated by the 50 States, the 
District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico, as well as with international organizations,
including Scotland Yard in the United Kingdom, the Royal Canadian Mounted 
Police, INTERPOL headquarters in Lyon, France, and others, which enable the 
Center to transmit images and information regarding missing and exploited children 
to law enforcement across the United States and around the world instantly.
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Guidelines (Guidelines)3 recommended a prison sentence of approximately 
five to six years.4 The district court, however, decided a Guidelines
sentence was not necessary.5  Instead, the court sentenced Stall to one
day in prison followed by a period of supervised release.6 
Investigators charged John Prisel with possession of child pornography
after discovering his collection, which included over a thousand images, 
five digital movies, and four videos.7  Forty of the children depicted 
were previously cataloged in the National Child Victim Identification
Program, and the videos featured children who were tied up and forced 
to engage in sexual acts.8  The presentence investigation report9 
recommended an upward departure from the Guidelines range of twenty-
seven to thirty-three months in prison because of the large number of 
images.10  Nevertheless, the district court imposed a non-Guidelines 
sentence of a single day in prison followed by a three-year period of 
supervised release.11 
42 U.S.C. § 5771(5) (2006), amended by 42 U.S.C. § 5771(9) (Supp. III 2008); see also
National Mandate and Mission, NAT’L CTR. FOR MISSING & EXPLOITED CHILDREN,
http://www.missingkids.com/missingkids/servlet/PageServlet?LanguageCountry=en_US
&PageId=1866 (last revised Oct. 14, 2008) (“[NCMEC’s] mission is to help prevent 
child abduction and sexual exploitation; help find missing children; and assist victims of
child abduction and sexual exploitation, their families, and the professionals who serve 
them.”).
3. The Guidelines are the product of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, which 
was passed in order to remedy a system plagued by sentencing disparities. See Sentencing 
Reform Act of 1984 § 217(a), 28 U.S.C. § 991 (2006); United States v. Mistretta, 488
U.S. 361, 366 (1989).  The Act established the United States Sentencing Commission to 
create and monitor a set of sentencing guidelines that were mandatory in the federal
courts.  See 28 U.S.C. § 991; U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 1, pt. A (2010). 
4. Stall, 581 F.3d at 277. 
5. See id. at 276, 281. 
6. See id. at 278 n.1 (noting that a sentence of supervised release requires a 
nominal prison sentence). 
7. United States v. Prisel, 316 F. App’x 377, 379–80 (6th Cir. 2008). 
8. Id. at 379. 
9. A United States probation officer must conduct a presentence investigation in
accordance with the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, and the officer must report the 
results to the court before sentencing.  18 U.S.C. § 3552(a) (2006).  The presentence 
report identifies the applicable Guidelines sentencing range and identifies any previously
enumerated basis for departing from the sentencing range.  FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(d)(1). 
The report also contains information regarding the history and characteristics of the 
defendant, including any prior criminal record, and any other information that might be 
helpful in sentencing the defendant. Id. 32(d)(2).
10. See Prisel, 316 F. App’x at 379. 
11. Id. at 380. 
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In both cases, psychological testimony favoring the defendant played 
a critical role in the sentencing judge’s decision, which is often the case
when judges impose a non-Guidelines or noncustodial sentence.12  In  
United States v. Prisel, the presentence report stated that there were not
any validated risk assessment tools to determine future risk in cases in
which an adult orders child pornography.13  The judge, however, decided
to rely on Prisel’s self-reported Abel Assessment test results14 and 
concluded the defendant was not a high risk.15  Interestingly, a recent 
study found that people who view child pornography are actually more 
likely to meet the criteria for pedophilia16 than convicted child molesters.17 
Sentencing defendants convicted of child pornography offenses below 
the Guidelines range goes against congressional intent regarding child
sex offenders, undermines the goal of uniformity in federal sentencing, 
and puts potential victims at risk.18  Below-the-Guidelines-range sentences,
and even noncustodial sentences, have become increasingly common in
federal district courts.19  Many of these non-Guidelines sentences are given
12. See United States v. Stall, 581 F.3d 276, 279–80 (6th Cir. 2009); Prisel, 316 F. 
App’x at 385; United States v. Grober, 595 F. Supp. 2d 382, 409 (D.N.J. 2008), aff’d, 
624 F.3d 592 (3d Cir. 2010). 
13. See Prisel, 316 F. App’x at 387. 
14. The Abel Assessment for Sexual Interest (AASI) is a procedure used to
measure sexual interest and arousal patterns.  Richard I. Lanyon, Psychological Assessment
Procedures in Sex Offending, 32 PROF. PSYCHOL.: RES. & PRAC. 253, 255 (2001).  The 
AASI is a two-part test.  Id.  The first part of the test is a self-report questionnaire, which
deals with the person’s sexual history. Id.  The second part measures visual reaction 
time.  Id.  The person views numerous slides and is asked to rate them on a scale of one
to seven—highly sexually disgusting through highly sexually arousing—and the person’s 
viewing time for each image and the person’s subjective rating of each image generates a 
score.  Id. The results are computer based, and the validity of the assessment is unclear.
Id. 
15. See Prisel, 316 F. App’x at 387. 
16. See AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF 
MENTAL DISORDERS 572 (4th ed. 2000) (defining pedophilia as “recurrent, intense 
sexually arousing fantasies, sexual urges, or behaviors involving sexual activity with a 
prepubescent child or children”).
17. Michael C. Seto et al., Child Pornography Offenses Are a Valid Diagnostic 
Indicator of Pedophilia, 115 J. ABNORMAL PSYCHOL. 610, 613 (2006). 
18. See Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 § 217(a), 28 U.S.C. § 991 (2006); 
Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools To End the Exploitation of Children Today Act 
of 2003 (PROTECT Act), Pub. L. No. 108-21, §§ 401, 501–503, 117 Stat. 650, 667–80;
Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 121, 110 Stat. 3009, 
3009-26 to -28; Child Protection Restoration and Penalties Enhancement Act of 1990, 
Pub. L. No. 101-647, § 323, 104 Stat. 4816, 4818; see also STEPHEN T. HOLMES &
RONALD M. HOLMES, SEX CRIMES: PATTERNS AND BEHAVIOR 121 (2d ed. 2002) (stating
that pedophiles are the largest audience for child pornography). 
19. See, e.g., United States v. Rowan, 530 F.3d 379, 380 (5th Cir. 2008) (affirming 
the district court’s noncustodial sentence of sixty months of probation for a defendant
convicted of possession of child pornography); United States v. Duhon, 541 F.3d 391,
394 (5th Cir. 2008) (affirming the district court’s noncustodial sentence of sixty months
of probation for a defendant convicted of possession of child pornography); United 
626
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to defendants convicted of possessing child pornography as opposed to
those convicted of producing, distributing, or receiving child pornography.20 
The reasoning appears to be based, at least in part, on the opinion that 
possession of child pornography is a victimless crime,21 and that possession 
offenses do not warrant the substantial prison sentences the Guidelines
recommend.22  Even though there are divergent views regarding the
criminalization of possession,23 Congress has indicated that possession is
a serious offense that warrants serious punishment.24  One major problem 
States v. Phinney, 599 F. Supp. 2d 1037, 1038, 1040, 1046 (E.D. Wis. 2009) (sentencing 
defendant convicted of possession of child pornography to six months as opposed to the
calculated range of thirty-seven to forty-six months, which included an enhancement for
possessing images of prepubescent minors, namely, files of boys engaged in sex acts); 
United States v. McElheney, 630 F. Supp. 2d 886, 887, 896–97 (E.D. Tenn. 2009) 
(sentencing defendant convicted of receipt of child pornography to prison term fifty-
seven months below the bottom of the Guidelines range even though the defendant
continued to download child pornography after being indicted and possessed three 
videos depicting sadistic behavior, one of which was of an adult trying to penetrate a 
two- or three-year-old girl); United States v. Riley, 655 F. Supp. 2d 1298, 1306 (S.D. 
Fla. 2009) (sentencing defendant convicted of transportation of child pornography with a 
calculated Guidelines range of 210 to 260 months to the statutory minimum of sixty
months). 
20. See, e.g., Rowan, 530 F.3d at 380; Duhon, 541 F.3d at 394; Phinney, 599
F. Supp. 2d at 1038, 1040, 1046; see also J. Elizabeth McBath, A Case Study in 
Achieving the Purpose of Incapacitation-Based Statutes: The Bail Reform Act of 1984 
and Possession of Child Pornography, 17 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 37, 39 (2010)
(discussing how in the majority of cases in 2009, most judges sentenced defendants 
within the range recommended by the Guidelines, but almost half of the federal judges in 
this country gave defendants sentences below the Guidelines when the defendant was 
charged with possession of child pornography).
21. See Audrey Rogers, Child Pornography’s Forgotten Victims, 28 PACE L. REV. 
847, 847 (2008). 
22. See United States v. Duhon, 440 F.3d 711, 714 (5th Cir. 2006) (“Before 
adjourning, the court expressed hostility toward the Sentencing Guidelines, lamented 
Congress’s criminalization of possessing child pornography, and promised that he would
give Duhon ‘the lowest sentence I can give consistent with my oath.’”), vacated, 552
U.S. 1088 (2008); see also Rogers, supra note 21, at 852 (discussing how substantial
deference is given to “insubstantial possession sentences” by the appellate courts and 
arguing to dispel the myth that possession is a victimless crime).
23. See Rogers, supra note 21, at 859–62 (discussing scholarly criticisms of
possession and concluding that possession of child pornography is different from other
possession offenses and should therefore be excluded from the general criticisms related
to possession). 
24. See Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-
248, § 501, 120 Stat. 587, 623 (finding that illegal activities related to child pornography—
including possession—“[are] harmful to the physiological, emotional, and mental health 
of the children depicted in child pornography and ha[ve] a substantial and detrimental 
effect on society as a whole”); Child Protection Restoration and Penalties Enhancement 
Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-647, § 323, 104 Stat. 4816, 4818 (amending 18 U.S.C. 
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with pre-Guidelines sentencing was that defendants with similar criminal
backgrounds often received dramatically different sentences depending 
on which district court judge happened to decide the case.25  Thus, the
Guidelines were created to avoid the disparities that existed in the pre-
Guidelines world.26  The advisory status27 of the Guidelines brings the
sentencing disparity issue back to the forefront28 and requires a solution 
that does not violate a defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights.29 
This Comment argues that Congress should amend the child
pornography statutes in order to prevent noncustodial sentences and to 
make some of the otherwise discretionary enhancements within the
Guidelines mandatory.  Part II of this Comment discusses the legislative
history of the once-mandatory Guidelines and presents an overview of 
the sentencing structure for those found guilty of a child pornography
offense in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2252 or 2252A.  Part II also briefly 
discusses the Supreme Court’s holding in United States v. Booker, which
rendered the Guidelines advisory.30  Part III illustrates how some district
court judges exercised their newfound discretion—the so-called reluctant 
rebellion—by giving defendants noncustodial sentences and sentences
far below the Guidelines,31 and it discusses the somewhat unsuccessful 
§ 2252 (2006) to criminalize the possession of child pornography); see also
Constitutionality of Sentencing Guidelines: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Sec. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 
(2006) [hereinafter Hearing] (statement of William W. Mercer, U.S. Att’y for the
District of Montana), reprinted in 18 FED. SENT’G REP. 205, 206 (2006) (noting that 
judges are using their authority to give below-Guidelines sentences in possession cases
and stating that this is a major concern due to the fact that it runs contrary to the 
PROTECT Act).
25. See William W. Wilkins, Jr., Response to Judge Heaney, 29 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 
795, 797 (1992) (discussing how before the Guidelines, “[t]he actual sentence imposed
was too often a result of the luck of the draw or the assignment of a particular judge to a 
case”).
26. See Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 § 217(a), 28 U.S.C. § 991 (2006); United
States v. Mistretta, 488 U.S. 361, 366 (1989). 
27. See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 245 (2005) (Breyer, J., delivering
the opinion of the Court in part) (severing the provision within the sentencing statute that
made the Guidelines mandatory and deeming the Guidelines effectively advisory—not 
binding—on the courts). 
28. Compare United States v. Rowan, 530 F.3d 379, 380 (5th Cir. 2008) (affirming the
district court’s noncustodial sentence of sixty months of probation for a defendant convicted
of possession of child pornography), with United States v. Cannel, 517 F.3d 1172, 1173
(9th Cir. 2008) (affirming a defendant’s seventy-two month prison sentence for possession of
child pornography).
29. See Booker, 543 U.S. at 245, 259 (rendering the Guidelines advisory in light of 
the potential Sixth Amendment violation in cases in which the judge finds facts that
change the length of the defendant’s sentence). 
30. See id.
31. See Mark Hansen, A Reluctant Rebellion, A.B.A. J., June 2009, at 54, 54–57
(discussing the criticisms related to the child pornography Guidelines and the fact that 
some federal judges believe they are too harsh); see, e.g., United States v. Duhon, 541 
628
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attempt by appellate courts to draw the line under the abuse of discretion 
standard the Supreme Court adopted in Gall v. United States.32  Part IV
analyzes the enumerated factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), which 
district courts must consider, and the appellate review process in light of 
the Supreme Court’s mandate that substantial deference be given to the 
district court’s sentencing determination.33  It also evaluates the
justifications judges provide when giving non-Guidelines and noncustodial
sentences.  Finally, Part V recommends a two-phase plan to amend the
child pornography statutes in order to avoid unwarranted sentencing
disparities and ensure congressional intent is carried out. 
II. BACKGROUND
A.  The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984
Congress enacted the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 to avoid the 
sentencing disparities that historically existed among the federal courts.34 
The Sentencing Reform Act established the United States Sentencing 
Commission (Commission)—an independent commission in the judicial 
branch—to develop and monitor the Guidelines.35  District court judges
F.3d 391, 394 (5th Cir. 2008) (affirming the district court’s decision to give a defendant
convicted of possession of child pornography a noncustodial sentence); United States v. 
Phinney, 599 F. Supp. 2d 1037, 1038, 1040, 1046 (E.D. Wis. 2009) (sentencing the 
defendant convicted of possession to a sentence thirty-one months below the low end of
the applicable Guidelines range).  For a well-reasoned response to Mark Hansen’s article, see
ALEXANDRA GELBER, CHILD EXPLOITATION AND OBSCENITY SECTION, CRIMINAL DIV.,
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, RESPONSE TO “A RELUCTANT REBELLION” 13–14 (2009), 
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/ceos/ReluctantRebellionResponse.pdf. 
32. See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007); see also United States v. 
Duhon, 440 F.3d 711, 721 (5th Cir. 2006) (reversing and remanding the district court’s 
decision to give the defendant a noncustodial sentence), vacated, 552 U.S. 1088 (2008)
(vacating and remanding the case for a redetermination in light of Gall); United States v. 
Rowan, 169 F. App’x 395, 396 (5th Cir. 2006) (per curiam) (reversing and remanding 
the district court’s decision to give the defendant a noncustodial sentence), vacated, 552 
U.S. 1088 (2008) (vacating and remanding the case for a redetermination in light of
Gall). 
33. See Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. 
34. See Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 § 217(a), 28 U.S.C. § 991 (2006); United
States v. Mistretta, 488 U.S. 361, 366 (1989). 
35. See 28 U.S.C. § 991; U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 1, pt. A 
(2010).  For an in-depth and comprehensive discussion of the development and 
enactment of the Guidelines under the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, see generally
Kate Stith & Steve Y. Koh, The Politics of Sentencing Reform: The Legislative History
of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 223 (1993). 
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had to use the Guidelines to calculate the mandatory sentence range, which
depended on the offense level, the particular crime, and the defendant’s
criminal history.36  Although the Guidelines were mandatory, a sentencing
judge could depart from the Guidelines if “there exist[ed] an aggravating 
or mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken 
into consideration by the Sentencing Commission.”37 
Any discretion district court judges once exercised was limited by the 
enactment of the Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools To End the 
Exploitation of Children Today Act of 2003 (PROTECT Act),38 which 
reiterated Congress’s commitment to protect children and strictly sentence 
those who commit sex offenses.39  The PROTECT Act amended 18
U.S.C. § 3553(b), and several individual sections of the Guidelines, to 
allow downward departures40 in child pornography cases only when the 
mitigating circumstance in question was previously and affirmatively 
identified as an appropriate reason for a departure.41  The PROTECT Act
36. See Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 § 212(a)(2), 18 U.S.C. § 3553 (2006). 
37. Id.; see, e.g., United States v. One Star, 9 F.3d 60, 61 (8th Cir. 1993) (affirming the
district court’s downward departure due to the “unusual mitigating circumstances of life 
on an Indian reservation,” which the district court deemed a mitigating circumstance not
adequately taken into account by the Commission). 
38. Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools To End the Exploitation of Children
Today Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-21, 117 Stat. 650. 
39. See id.; see also Child Protection Restoration and Penalties Enhancement Act 
of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-647, § 323, 104 Stat. 4816, 4818 (amending 18 U.S.C. § 2252
to criminalize the possession of child pornography).
40. Downward departures are sentences below the applicable Guidelines range.
See Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools To End the Exploitation of Children Today
Act of 2003 § 401 (discussing the limited circumstances under which a downward
departure is permissible in child-related criminal cases—including all child pornography
cases—and the amendments to the Guidelines); see also U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES
MANUAL § 5K2.0(b)(1) (2010) (limiting the permissible grounds for a downward
departure in “child crimes and sexual offenses” to mitigating circumstances that “[have]
been affirmatively and specifically identified as a permissible ground of downward 
departure in the sentencing guidelines or policy statements”).
41. Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools To End the Exploitation of Children
Today Act of 2003 § 401; see 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (2006); U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES
MANUAL § 5K2.0(b)(1) (2010).  Examples of previously identified appropriate reasons 
include age and extraordinary physical impairment.  See  U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES
MANUAL § 5K2.22 (2010) (stating that age “may be a reason to depart downward only if
and to the extent permitted by § 5H1.1,” and that “[a]n extraordinary physical
impairment may be a reason to depart downward only if and to the extent permitted 
by § 5H1.4”).  Under the current Guidelines—amended November 1, 2010—age “may
be relevant in determining whether a departure is warranted, if considerations based on
age, individually or in combination with other offender characteristics, are present to an 
unusual degree and distinguish the case from the typical cases covered by the guidelines.”  Id.
§ 5H1.1.  Additionally, it might “be a reason to depart downward in a case in which the 
defendant is elderly and infirm and where a form of punishment such as home
confinement might be equally efficient as and less costly than incarceration.”  Id. In
terms of physical impairments, “[a]n extraordinary physical impairment may be a reason
630
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also changed the appellate standard of review to de novo for cases in
which the district court sentenced a defendant outside the Guidelines 
range.42  In light of the number of downward departures in child
pornography cases, Congress sought to curb judicial discretion by
prohibiting downward departures on nonspecified grounds and by changing
the standard of review to limit judicial discretion.43  These amendments 
indicated Congress’s clear intent for criminals convicted of child
pornography offenses to face harsh penalties in every federal court.44 
B.  The Sentencing Structure for Those Found Guilty of     
Child Pornography Offenses 
Defendants convicted of transporting, receiving, distributing, selling, 
reproducing, or possessing child pornography or visual depictions of a 
minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 
§§ 2252A or 2252,45 are sentenced according to Guidelines section 
to depart downward; e.g., in the case of a seriously infirm defendant, home detention may be
as efficient as, and less costly than, imprisonment.” Id. § 5H1.4.
42. See Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools To End the Exploitation of 
Children Today Act of 2003 § 401; 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e) (2006).  Prior to the PROTECT 
Act, appellate courts had to defer to the district court’s application of the Guidelines in 
light of the particular facts.  See 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e); Prosecutorial Remedies and Other 
Tools To End the Exploitation of Children Today Act of 2003 § 401. 
43. See Alan Vinegrad, The New Federal Sentencing Law, 15 FED. SENT’G REP.
310, 310–12 (2003) (“A primary justification for the amendment was the perception that
sentences in child pornography cases were too low because of a disproportionately high 
incidence of downward departures.”); see also Kate Stith, The Arc of the Pendulum: 
Judges, Prosecutors, and the Exercise of Discretion, 117 YALE L.J. 1420, 1467 (2008)
(discussing that although the original version of the PROTECT Act would have applied 
in all cases, “[i]n the final bill, the nearly absolute prohibition on judicial downward 
departures was limited to crimes involving child pornography, sexual abuse, and child 
trafficking”).  For an example of a pre-PROTECT Act case in which the sentencing 
judge gave a defendant a below-the-Guidelines sentence, see United States v. Shasky, 
939 F. Supp. 695, 695–70 (D. Neb. 1996), which discusses the reasons for giving a below-
the-Guidelines sentence of probation—including six months of home confinement—to a 
state trooper convicted of receiving sexually explicit material involving minors. 
44. See generally Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools To End the Exploitation 
of Children Today Act of 2003 § 401 (amending the then-mandatory Guidelines to
reduce the incidence of departures and increase the offense level in child pornography
cases involving material that portrays violent or sadistic conduct and in cases in which
the defendant possesses a large number of images).
 45. The term child pornography statutes will be used throughout this Comment to
refer to offenses in violation of §§ 2252 or 2252A.  Section 2252 prohibits “[c]ertain
activities relating to material involving the sexual exploitation of minors” and deals with 
visual depictions of “a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct.”  18 U.S.C. § 2252 
(2006).  Section 2252A, on the other hand, prohibits “[c]ertain activities relating to
 631






   
 





   
 
 









     
 
 
   









2G2.2.46  Both statutes impose minimum and maximum sentences for all 
offenses except possession, which has a maximum sentence of ten years
of imprisonment but currently does not have a statutory minimum under 
either statute.47  There is also an affirmative defense available to defendants
charged with possession.48  The affirmative defense is important because
it eliminates the possibility of convicting a person who mistakenly
downloads child pornography.49  Once a defendant is convicted under 
either statute, the judge must determine the applicable offense level and 
the defendant’s criminal history category in order to produce the proper 
Guidelines sentence range.50 
C.  United States v. Booker and the Increase in         
Below-the-Guidelines Sentences 
In 2005, the Supreme Court decided United States v. Booker, which 
rendered the Guidelines advisory.51  The Court held that the Guidelines
material constituting or containing child pornography.” Id. § 2252A.  Section 2252A is
broader because child pornography includes depictions “of a minor engaging in sexually
explicit conduct” as well as computer-generated images that are indistinguishable from “a
minor engaging in sexuality explicit conduct” or depictions “created, adapted, or 
modified to appear that an identifiable minor is engaging in sexually explicit conduct.” 
Id. § 2256. 
46. Id. §§ 2252, 2252A; U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2G2.2 (2010). 
47. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2252, 2252A. 
48. Id. §§ 2252(c), 2252A(d). 
49. See id. §§ 2252(c), 2252A(d) (outlining the affirmative defense available if the 
person takes reasonable steps to destroy the material or promptly reports the matter to
law enforcement).
 50. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.1 (2010).  The offense level in
child pornography cases is predominately based upon the provisions within section 
2G2.2 of the Sentencing Guidelines Manual, but potential adjustments to the initial
calculation also come from other parts of the Guidelines. Id. §§ 1B1.1, 2G2.2; see, e.g.,
id. § 3E1.1 (giving a defendant a two-level decrease for taking responsibility); id.
§ 3B1.2 (giving a defendant who was a minimal participant in the criminal activity a 
four-level decrease).  A defendant’s prior criminal acts dictate the criminal history category
into which the defendant is placed. See id. § 4A1.1.  The criminal history category, in 
conjunction with the final offense level, produces the sentence range.  See id. ch. 5, pt. 
A.  The base level for a defendant convicted of a child pornography offense is level 
eighteen for possession and level twenty-two for all other offenses in violation of the 
child pornography statutes.  Id. § 2G2.2(a).  The defendant’s offense level increases or
decreases based on the specific offense characteristics listed in section 2G2.2(b) and the 
possible adjustments specified in chapter three of the Guidelines. Id. § 2G2.2(b), ch. 3; 
see, e.g., id. § 3E1.1 (stating that a defendant who “clearly demonstrates acceptance of
responsibility for his offense” is entitled to a two-level decrease).  Accordingly, a 
defendant with no criminal record who is convicted of possession of child pornography,
accepts responsibility, and is not subject to any of the enhancements ends up with an 
offense level of sixteen and a prison sentence range of twenty-one to twenty-seven 
months.  Id. § 2G2.2, ch. 5, pt. A, sentencing tbl. 
51. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 245, 259 (2005) (Breyer, J., delivering 
the opinion of the Court in part).
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violate a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial when the trial
judge’s additional findings enhance the sentence beyond what is authorized
by the jury’s verdict.52  The remedial majority decided that there were 
two options in light of this substantive holding.53 
The first option the Court considered would have added the Court’s 
constitutional requirement into the Sentencing Reform Act.54  The 
Guidelines would have remained mandatory as long as the jury found, or 
the defendant admitted, all of the facts that affected the length of the 
sentence.55  This remedial approach would have only required juries to
make additional decisions in a minority of cases because most criminal
matters are resolved through plea bargaining, which takes place without 
a jury.56  The second approach, ultimately adopted by the remedial majority, 
made the Guidelines advisory in order to cure the Sixth Amendment 
problem.57  The remedial majority believed Congress would have preferred 
“mak[ing] the Guidelines system advisory while maintaining a strong 
connection between the sentence imposed and the offender’s real conduct.”58 
Thus, the decision was based on preserving “the increased uniformity of 
sentencing that Congress intended its Guidelines system to achieve.”59 
52. Id. at 244–45. 
53. See id. at 245–46 
54. Id. at 246. 
55. See id.  This option would have ensured that there was not a violation of the 
defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights by “preventing the sentencing court from increasing a 
sentence on the basis of a fact that the jury did not find (or that the offender did not 
admit).”  Id. 
56. See id. at 246–48 (“It is, of course, true that the numbers show that the
constitutional jury trial requirement would lead to additional decision-making by juries 
in only a minority of cases.”). 
57. See id. at 246. 
58. Id.
59. Id.  Justice Breyer—who wrote the remedial majority opinion—explained why
it was unwise to add the Court’s constitutional requirement to the current Sentencing
Reform Act instead of making the Guidelines advisory as follows: 
To engraft the Court’s constitutional requirement onto the sentencing
statutes, however, would destroy the system.  It would prevent a judge from 
relying upon a presentence report for factual information, relevant to
sentencing, uncovered after the trial.  In doing so, it would, even compared to
pre-Guidelines sentencing, weaken the tie between a sentence and an offender’s 
real conduct.  It would thereby undermine the sentencing statute’s basic aim of 
ensuring similar sentences for those who have committed similar crimes in
similar ways.
Id. at 252.  Justice Breyer actually wrote a dissenting opinion in response to the Court’s 
substantive holding that the Sixth Amendment requires a jury to find all facts that affect
the Guidelines range.  See id. at 326–34 (Breyer, J., dissenting in part).  The remedial 
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Despite the Court’s mandate that sentencing courts were still required to
consider the applicable Guidelines range,60 severing the provision of the 
sentencing statute that made the Guidelines mandatory61 inevitably opened
the discretionary door.62 
Justices Stevens, Scalia, Souter, and Thomas dissented from the remedial 
majority’s opinion.63  Justice Stevens’s dissenting opinion emphasized 
the fact that making the Guidelines advisory was not the only way to
protect the Sixth Amendment rights of every defendant.64  He also stated 
that the majority’s decision “represents a policy choice that Congress has 
considered and decisively rejected.”65  Justice Scalia criticized the remedial
majority’s interpretation of Congress’s primary objectives.66  He  
characterized the irony of the remedial majority’s decision as follows:
“In order to rescue from nullification a statutory scheme designed to 
eliminate discretionary sentencing, it discards the provisions that
eliminate discretionary sentencing.”67  Finally, Justice Thomas argued 
that the Court’s precedents called for the invalidation of the statute as
applied to Booker but did not permit the Court to invalidate the statute in
its entirety.68 
opinion was necessary due to the substantive holding.  See id. at 226–29 & 229 n.1
(Stevens, J., delivering the opinion of the Court in part) (stating that the first question 
presented is whether there is a Sixth Amendment violation in cases in which the judge 
finds facts that enhance the sentence, and, if yes, the second question asks the Court for
the remedy).  Four of the five justices who made up the remedial majority dissented 
regarding the Court’s substantive holding.  See id. at 226, 244; id. at 326 (Thomas, J.,
dissenting in part).  Therefore, it appears that the current advisory system was created by
a group of justices who—with the exception of Justice Ginsburg—did not believe that 
there was a Sixth Amendment violation requiring a remedy in the first place.  See id. at 
244 (Stevens, J., delivering the opinion of the Court in part); id. at 326 (Thomas, J., 
dissenting in part).  
60. Id. at 245 (Breyer, J., delivering the opinion of the Court in part).
61. Id.
62. See Paul J. Hofer, Immediate and Long-Term Effects of United States v. 
Booker: More Discretion, More Disparity, or Better Reasoned Sentences?, 38 ARIZ. ST.
L.J. 425, 425 (2006) (“Since the United States Supreme Court’s decision in United States 
v. Booker, the percentage of federal sentences falling within the range recommended by
the federal sentencing guidelines has decreased.” (footnote omitted)).
63. See Booker, 543 U.S. at 272 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part); id. at 303 (Scalia, 
J., dissenting in part); id. at 313–14 (Thomas, J., dissenting in part). 
64. See id. at 272 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part). 
65. Id.  Justice Stevens also reiterated that the Guidelines are constitutional in the 
majority of cases and that limiting sentences to the range supported by jury findings and 
the facts admitted to by the defendant eliminates the risk of violating the defendant’s 
Sixth Amendment rights. See id. at 279. 
66. See id. at 303 (Scalia, J., dissenting in part).
67. Id. at 304. 
68. See id. at 313–14 (Thomas, J., dissenting in part) (stating that the Court is not 
allowed to invalidate the statute in its entirety if the plaintiff does not establish that the 
statute is invalid in every situation).
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In the wake of Booker, the imposition of non-government-sponsored69 
below-the-Guidelines-range sentences immediately increased.70 Accordingly, 
in 2006, Congress reiterated the seriousness of all offenses related to 
child pornography and noted that the advent of the Internet only
exacerbated the problem due to ease of access.71  Congress found that
intrastate distribution, receipt, and possession of child pornography fuel
the interstate market and are harmful to the children depicted and to
society as a whole.72  Congressional findings also indicated that all of 
these illegal acts increase demand and encourage the production of more 
depictions of children being sexually abused.73  Nevertheless, some 
district court judges believed that the Guidelines are too harsh on child
pornography offenders, and armed with the discretionary power provided
by Booker, these judges began to make their opinions known.74 
69. According to the Commission, cases are deemed as being sponsored by the 
government in a variety of situations, including: sponsorship pursuant to a plea bargain,
due to stipulations, deportation, waiver of indictment or appeal, in cases in involving
early disposition program departures, and on other government motions.  U.S.
SENTENCING COMM’N, 2006 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS 159
(2007). 
 70. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, FINAL REPORT ON THE IMPACT OF UNITED STATES V.
BOOKER ON FEDERAL SENTENCING 47 (2006), http://www.ussc.gov/Legislative_and_Public_
Affairs/Congressional_Testimony_and_Reports/Submissions/200603_Booker/Booker
_Report.pdf [hereinafter FINAL REPORT].
71. See Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-
248, § 501, 120 Stat. 587, 623; YAMAN AKDENIZ, INTERNET CHILD PORNOGRAPHY AND 
THE LAW: NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL RESPONSES 1, 7–8 (2008). 
72. Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-248,
§ 501, 120 Stat. 587, 623. 
73. See id.
74. See United States v. Duhon, 440 F.3d 711, 714 (5th Cir. 2006) (noting that the 
district court judge criticized Congress for criminalizing the possession of child pornography),
vacated, 552 U.S. 1088 (2008). 
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III. THE RELUCTANT REBELLION BEGINS
A.  Case Illustrations: Below-the-Guidelines Sentences and 
Noncustodial Sentences 
In United States v. Grossman,75 the National Center for Missing and
Exploited Children received a report indicating that Kurt Grossman—the 
father of a two-year-old girl—attempted to entice children to engage in
sexual acts.76  The individual who supplied the tip said Grossman enjoyed 
discussing his interest in child abuse and “kinky kids” with people, which
the individual learned by communicating with Grossman online.77  Further 
investigation revealed that Grossman was an active participant in a child 
pornography-sharing Internet group, and that he sent multiple e-mails 
containing child pornography.78  Investigating agents searched his computer
and discovered over 600 images of child pornography, some involving 
prepubescent minors and sadistic conduct.79  The Guidelines recommended 
a range of 135 to 168 months in prison.80  The district court judge noted
that he was “troubled” and “shocked” because, in his opinion, the
Guidelines did not reflect what Grossman actually did.81 After pointing
out that Grossman was educated and knew what he did was wrong, the
judge sentenced him to a non-Guidelines prison term of sixty-six
months.82 
In a similar case, United States v. Wachowiak,83 a defendant convicted
of receiving child pornography received a sentence of seventy months in 
prison even though the Guidelines recommended 121 to 151 months.84 
The judge indicated that the only reason he did not sentence the
defendant to the statutory minimum of sixty months was because a 
number of the images involved extremely young children and sadistic 
conduct.85  He also listed several factors he believed the Guidelines 
75. United States v. Grossman, 513 F.3d 592 (6th Cir. 2008). 




80. Id.  The range had to be reduced to 120 months due to the applicable statutory
maximum for possession.  Id. 
81. Id.; see also Hansen, supra note 31, at 56 (discussing how District Judge 
Robert Holmes Bell was “troubled” by the discovery that the thirty-five-year-old married 
man and father was facing a prison sentence of more than a decade for “a single count of 
possessing child porn”). 
82. Grossman, 513 F.3d at 595. 
83. United States v. Wachowiak, 412 F. Supp. 2d 958 (E.D. Wis. 2006), aff’d, 496
F.3d 744 (7th Cir. 2007). 
84. Id. at 959, 964. 
85. See id. at 964. 
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failed to take into account.86  One of the factors mentioned was the 
defendant’s character, which is one of the factors listed in § 3553(a)(1).87 
The judge stated that although “§ 3553(a)(1) requires the court to consider 
the character of the defendant, the Guidelines account only for criminal 
history,” and “[i]n cases where the defendant led an otherwise praiseworthy 
life, the court should consider a sentence below the advisory range.”88 
The Guidelines, however, provide a sentence range that gives the judge 
latitude to exercise discretion based on the defendant’s good character.89 
The judges in Grossman and Wachowiak relied on the language of
§ 3553(a), which requires judges to impose a sentence that is “sufficient 
but not greater than necessary” to comply with the factors set forth in
that section of the code.90 Both judges indicated that the Guidelines 
range was greater than necessary, and due to the advisory status of the
Guidelines, both judges were able to sentence the defendant according to 
their individual opinions.91 
B.  Appellate Courts to the Rescue?
1.  The Story of Duhon and Rowan
Noncustodial sentences for defendants convicted of possession of 
child pornography also started to appear in the wake of Booker.  The 
United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana—in
two separate cases decided by different judges—gave the defendants in
United States v. Duhon and United States v. Rowan noncustodial sentences
for possession of child pornography.92 Richard Rowan was convicted 
86. Id. at 963. 
87. Id.; see infra Part IV.A.2.
88. See Wachowiak, 412 F. Supp. 2d at 963. 
89. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 1, pt. A, subpt. 1(4)(h) (2010)
(stating that the range “permit[s] courts to exercise the greatest permissible range of 
sentencing discretion”); see also Douglas A. Berman, The Virtues of Offense/Offender
Distinctions, in  CRIMINAL LAW CONVERSATIONS 611, 621 (Paul H. Robinson et al. eds., 
2009) (discussing that many judges started to take offender characteristics into account due to 
the discretionary power provided by Booker). 
90. See United States v. Grossman, 513 F.3d 592, 594 (6th Cir. 2008) (quoting 18 
U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006)); Wachowiak, 412 F. Supp. 2d at 959. 
91. See Grossman, 513 F.3d at 594 (stating that the district court judge believed
that the Guidelines sentence was not fair and did not reflect the defendant’s crime); 
Wachowiak, 412 F. Supp. 2d at 962 (stating that a sentence within the Guidelines range 
was “greater than necessary to comply with the purposes of sentencing”).
92. See United States v. Rowan, 530 F.3d 379, 380 (5th Cir. 2008) (discussing the 
district court’s sentencing decision); United States v. Duhon, 440 F.3d 711, 713–14 (5th
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after the authorities found over four hundred images of child pornography
in his possession.93  The district court decided his offense did not
warrant any jail time.94  Instead, the judge gave Rowan a non-Guidelines
sentence of sixty months of probation.95 
David Duhon admitted he downloaded images of girls between the 
ages of eight and ten years old from the Internet.96  His illegal collection 
included a picture of a young girl being raped by an adult male and
being forced to perform oral sex.97  At Duhon’s sentencing hearing, the
judge decided to wait on sentencing Duhon until after the Supreme 
Court decided Booker, and he assured the defendant he would give him 
“the lowest sentence I can give consistent with my oath.”98 After
Booker, the sentencing hearing was reconvened.99  The judge
characterized the Guidelines as “totally discretionary” and stated that he
would use this discretion to sentence Duhon to sixty months of probation.100 
The government appealed the district court’s decisions in Rowan and 
Duhon.101  The Fifth Circuit held that the sentence the district court gave
Duhon was unreasonable in light of the enumerated § 3553(a) factors.102 
Although the district court certainly took the characteristics of the
defendant into account, the ultimate sentence failed to give significant 
weight to other important factors, including the seriousness of the 
offense.103  Additionally, the Fifth Circuit noted that the district court
judge “expressed hostility toward the Sentencing Guidelines, [and]
lamented Congress’s criminalization of possessing child pornography.”104 
In reviewing the district court’s decision, the Fifth Circuit went on to say
that the judge’s comments “suggest that the court believed Duhon’s
offense was not harmful to children” and that the judge “suggested that 
Cir. 2006) (discussing the sentence imposed by the district court), vacated, 552 
U.S. 1088 (2008). 
93. See United States v. Duhon, 541 F.3d 391, 399 (5th Cir. 2008) (discussing the
district court’s sentence of Rowan in comparison to Duhon). 
94. Rowan, 530 F.3d at 380. 
95. Id.
96. Duhon, 440 F.3d at 713, 719. 
97. Id. at 719 (discussing the fact that the images “included photographs of a girl 
being raped by an adult male, forced to perform oral sex and placing foreign objects into
her vagina”). 
98. Id. at 714. 
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.; United States v. Rowan, 169 F. App’x 395, 396 (5th Cir. 2006) (per curiam)
(vacating and remanding Rowan’s sentence in light of Duhon), vacated, 552 U.S. 1088 
(2008). 
102. Duhon, 440 F.3d at 713. 
103. Id. at 715. 
104. Id. at 714. 
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prosecuting child pornography cases was a waste of time and resources.”105 
After deciding Duhon, the Fifth Circuit vacated the district court’s 
decision in Rowan and remanded the case so that Rowan could receive a 
new sentence pursuant to the Fifth Circuit’s opinion in Duhon.106  Both
defendants petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari.107 
2.  The Supreme Court’s Decision in Gall v. United States
The fate of the defendants in Rowan and Duhon was the result of the 
Court’s decision in Gall v. United States,108 which the Court decided
before granting certiorari in Rowan or Duhon.109  In Gall, the Court
created a bifurcated process for appellate review.110  The first step in the
appellate review process is determining whether the district court 
committed a procedural error.111  Assuming that the district court did not
make a procedural error, the appellate court must move on to the second
step in the review process, which involves reviewing the sentence to 
determine if it is substantively reasonable.112  The court must use the
abuse of discretion standard in determining whether the sentence was
substantively reasonable.113  Under Gall, appellate courts may presume 
that a sentence within the Guidelines is reasonable, but they cannot 
presume that a sentence outside the Guidelines range is unreasonable.114 
Additionally, although circuit courts may consider how much the district 
court deviated from the Guidelines, they are required to “give due
deference to the district court’s decision that the § 3553(a) factors, on a 
whole, justify the extent of the variance.”115  Finally, even when the
circuit court disagrees with the district court, the fact that the appellate
105. Id. at 717–18. 
106. Rowan, 169 F. App’x at 396. 
107. Duhon v. United States, 552 U.S. 1088 (2008); Rowan v. United States, 552 
U.S. 1088 (2008). 
108. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38 (2007). 
109. Duhon, 552 U.S. at 1088; Rowan, 552 U.S. at 1088. 
110. Gall, 552 U.S. at 49–51. 
111. Id. at 51.  Procedural errors include any of the following: not calculating or 
miscalculating the Guidelines range, treating the Guidelines as mandatory as opposed to
advisory, failing to consider the § 3553(a) factors, imposing a sentence based on facts








































court would have imposed a different sentence is not a sufficient reason 
for reversal.116 
After deciding Gall, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Rowan
and Duhon.117  Both decisions were vacated and remanded back to the Fifth 
Circuit for redetermination in light of the Court’s opinion in Gall.118 
Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit was forced to take a second look at both
cases through a much more deferential lens.119 
3.  Rowan and Duhon on Remand 
On remand, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s probation-
only sentences in Rowan and Duhon.120  In Rowan, the court went through 
the two-step review process almost robotically.121  In a fairly brief opinion, 
which mainly consisted of a restatement of the review process set forth 
in Gall, the court affirmed the district court’s conclusion that a probationary 
sentence was appropriate.122  Although the Fifth Circuit was compelled
to affirm the case in light of the Court’s decision in Gall, the cursory
nature of the opinion on remand and its reluctant tone suggest that the 
Fifth Circuit believed it decided the case correctly the first time.123 
When the Fifth Circuit originally decided Duhon, it discussed the 
district court judge’s opinion at length and pointed out numerous reasons 
why the sentence imposed was unreasonable.124  The court emphasized 
the fact that the district court judge downplayed the seriousness of the
116. See id.
117. Duhon v. United States, 552 U.S. 1088 (2008); Rowan v. United States, 552 
U.S. 1088 (2008). 
118. Duhon, 552 U.S. at 1088; Rowan, 552 U.S. at 1088. 
119. See Rogers, supra note 21, at 852 (“We cannot rely on the appellate courts to 
fix inappropriate sentences since their powers have been reined in by the recent Supreme 
Court decision in Gall v. United States, which mandates that appellate courts apply a 
highly deferential abuse of discretion standard in reviewing federal sentences.” (footnote 
omitted)).
120. United States v. Duhon, 541 F.3d 391, 394 (5th Cir. 2008); United States v. 
Rowan, 530 F.3d 379, 380 (5th Cir. 2008). 
121. See Rowan, 530 F.3d at 381 (stating that the district court concluded “that a 
non-Guidelines sentence of a sixty-month period of probation was appropriate” and
affirming “[i]n light of the deferential standard set forth in Gall”).
122. Id.
123. Compare Duhon, 541 F.3d at 399 (affirming the district court’s decision in 
light of the Supreme Court’s mandate in Gall that substantial deference be given to the
district court’s sentencing decision), with United States v. Duhon, 440 F.3d 711, 713, 
720 (5th Cir. 2006) (stating that “the district court severely misjudged the seriousness of
Duhon’s possession of child pornography,” and noting the sentence imposed “[was] 
unreasonable with regard to the sentencing factors”), vacated, 552 U.S. at 1088. 
124. See Duhon, 440 F.3d at 713–21 (listing the various reasons why the judge’s 
opinion was unreasonable and ultimately concluding that “the totality of the statutory 
sentencing factors fails to reasonably support the court’s sentence”). 
640
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offense and assured the defendant he would give him the lowest possible 
sentence.125  The judge’s hostility towards the Guidelines, his criticism
regarding Congress’s criminalization of possession, and his statement 
about how prosecuting child pornography cases wastes the government’s
time and money all led to the Fifth Circuit’s original conclusion that the 
sentence was unreasonable.126  On remand, the Fifth Circuit focused on 
the Supreme Court’s mandate that “when reviewing the district court’s
sentencing decision for substantive reasonableness,” appellate courts are
required to “give due deference to the district court’s decision.”127 
Nevertheless, if the type of reasoning employed by the district court
judge in Duhon could not be vacated as substantively unreasonable, it is
hard to imagine what could. 
The Supreme Court did not explicitly state that it was reasonable to 
give a defendant convicted of possession of child pornography a
noncustodial sentence, but in the end, the district court decisions in
Duhon and Rowan remain intact.128  In the absence of a mandatory 
minimum prison sentence for possession of child pornography, it is 
possible for a defendant to avoid incarceration if the sentencing judge 
believes that the Guidelines are too harsh, that possessing child 
pornography should not be a criminal offense,129 or that child pornography
is a victimless crime.130  Congress has indicated that possession is a serious
offense.131  In light of Gall, however, it appears that as long as a district
125. See id. at 718–19 (noting that the district court said “Duhon’s offense was just 
a ‘dumb thing,’ a ‘stupid thing,’ and merely a ‘screw up,’” which the Fifth Circuit said 
“understates the harm caused by possessing child pornography”). 
126. See id. at 714, 717–18 (saying the district court judge’s comments “suggest
that the court believed Duhon’s offense was not harmful to children” and that the judge 
“suggested that prosecuting child pornography cases was a waste of time and resources”). 
127. Duhon, 541 F.3d at 399. 
128. Id. at 394; United States v. Rowan, 530 F.3d 379, 380 (5th Cir. 2008). 
129. See Duhon, 440 F.3d at 714, 719; see also Wilkins, Jr., supra note 25, at 797 
(discussing how before the Guidelines, “[t]he actual sentence imposed was too often a 
result of the luck of the draw or the assignment of a particular judge to a case”).
130. See Rogers, supra note 21, at 849–52 (discussing numerous cases in which the 
judge agreed that child pornography is a victimless crime and took this factor into 
account when sentencing the defendant).
131. See generally Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, Pub. L. 
No. 109-248, § 501, 120 Stat. 587, 623 (finding that illegal activities related to child
pornography—including possession—“[are] harmful to the physiological, emotional, and
mental health of the children depicted in child pornography and ha[ve] a substantial and 
detrimental effect on society as a whole”); Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools To 
End the Exploitation of Children Today Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-21, §§ 401, 501–
503, 117 Stat. 650, 667–80 (amending 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) to only allow departures 
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court judge avoids committing a procedural error and considers all of the 
enumerated factors set forth in § 3553(a),132 the appellate court faces an 
uphill battle in carrying out congressional intent.133 
IV. THE CURRENT STATE OF AFFAIRS
A.  The Enumerated Statutory Sentencing Factors and the     
Role of the Guidelines 
The current sentencing scheme requires district courts to consider all 
of the statutory factors listed in § 3553(a) and to impose a sentence 
“sufficient, but not greater than necessary” to comply with the purposes 
set forth in § 3553(a)(2).134 The Guidelines are part of the enumerated
statutory factors,135 and the sentencing court must begin the sentencing
process by calculating the Guidelines range.136 Theoretically, and 
historically speaking, the calculated Guidelines range should be equivalent 
to the outcome of weighing all of the § 3553(a) factors.137  Nevertheless, in
Spears v. United States, the Court opened the discretionary door even
from the Guidelines when the applicable mitigating circumstance was previously and 
affirmatively identified as an appropriate reason for a departure and changing the
appellate standard of review to de novo); Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996, 
Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 121, 110 Stat. 3009, 3009-26 to -28 (finding that “prohibiting the 
possession and viewing of child pornography will encourage the possessors of such 
material to rid themselves of or destroy the material”); Child Protection Restoration and 
Penalties Enhancement Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-647, § 323, 104 Stat. 4816, 4818 
(amending 18 U.S.C. § 2252 to criminalize the possession of child pornography).
132. See infra Part IV.B.1.
133. See Rogers, supra note 21, at 852 (“We cannot rely on the appellate courts to 
fix inappropriate sentences since their powers have been reined in by the recent Supreme 
Court decision in Gall v. United States, which mandates that appellate courts apply a 
highly deferential abuse of discretion standard in reviewing federal sentences.” (footnote 
omitted)).  In Justice Alito’s dissenting opinion in Gall, he discusses that the point of the 
remedial opinion in Booker was to ensure “that the post-Booker sentencing regime would
still promote the Sentencing Reform Act’s goal of reducing sentencing disparities.”  Gall
v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 63 (2007) (Alito, J., dissenting).  He then said that “[i]t is
unrealistic to think this goal can be achieved over the long term if sentencing judges need
only give lipservice to the Guidelines.”  Id.  Therefore, it remains unclear what would actually
warrant a reversal under the abuse of discretion standard in light of the fact that “[t]he
other sentencing factors set out in § 3553(a) are so broad that they impose few real 
restraints on sentencing judges.”  Id. 
134. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006). 
135. Id. § 3553(a)(4).
136. See Gall, 552 U.S. at 49 (majority opinion) (reaffirming that a district court 
should begin the sentencing process by calculating the Guidelines range, and that “[a]s a matter
of administration and to secure nationwide consistency, the Guidelines should be the 
starting point and the initial benchmark”).
137. See Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 350 (2007) (“[I]it is fair to assume that 
the Guidelines, insofar as practicable, reflect a rough approximation of sentences that might
achieve § 3553(a)’s objectives.”). 
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further by holding that a district court can categorically reject the “crack-
to-powder ratio”138 set forth by the Guidelines solely based on a policy 
disagreement—a belief that the Guidelines are too harsh.139 Some
district court judges utilized the holding in Spears to categorically reject the 
child pornography Guidelines.140  The current system forces certain judges,
who will inevitably reject the calculated range based on policy
objections, to go through the motions of calculating the applicable 
Guidelines range only to reject it entirely.141  Part IV.A.1–4 discusses 
some of the enumerated factors judges must consider and how judges 
who impose sentences below the Guidelines in child pornography cases 
treat each factor. 
1.  The Nature and Circumstances of the Offense 
The first factor listed in § 3553(a) is “the nature and circumstances of 
the offense.”142  In  United States v. Grober, the district court began its
discussion of this factor by saying that the defendant’s child pornography 
collection included more than 1500 pictures and over 200 videos.143 
Ultimately, the court was “not convinced that Grober’s child pornography 
138. Spears v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 840, 844 (2009) (per curiam).  Under the
version of the Guidelines in place at the time Spears was sentenced, there was a “100:1
ratio between powder cocaine and crack cocaine quantities.”  Id. at 841.  As the Supreme 
Court explained in Kimbrough v. United States, “[u]nder the statute criminalizing the 
manufacture and distribution of crack cocaine, and the relevant Guidelines prescription,
a drug trafficker dealing in crack cocaine is subject to the same sentence as one dealing 
in 100 times more powder cocaine.”  552 U.S. 85, 91 (2007) (citations omitted). 
139. See Spears, 129 S. Ct. at 843–44 (“[D]istrict courts are entitled to reject and vary
categorically from the crack-cocaine Guidelines based on a policy disagreement with those
Guidelines.”).
140. See United States v. Beiermann, 599 F. Supp. 2d 1087, 1104 (N.D. Iowa 2009) 
(stating that section 2G2.2 “should be rejected on categorical, policy grounds” because it is
entitled to little deference and it is within the district court’s power to reject it completely).
141. See Gall, 552 U.S. at 63 (Alito, J., dissenting) (discussing the goal of
decreasing sentencing disparities and noting that “[i]t is unrealistic to think this goal can
be achieved over the long term if sentencing judges need only give lipservice to the 
Guidelines”); Jelani Jefferson Exum, The More Things Change: A Psychological Case 
Against Allowing the Federal Sentencing Guidelines To Stay the Same in Light of Gall, 
Kimbrough, and New Understandings of Reasonableness Review, 58 CATH. U. L. REV.
115, 117 (2008) (arguing that judges should not have to calculate the applicable Guidelines
range before deciding what sentence is reasonable). 
142. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1) (2006). 
143. United States v. Grober, 595 F. Supp. 2d 382, 404 (D.N.J. 2008), aff’d, 624 
F.3d 592 (3d Cir. 2010). 
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collection [wa]s egregiously large.”144  The fact that the defendant also 
possessed a large amount of legal adult pornography appeared to play a 
role in the judge’s determination that the amount of child pornography
was not “egregiously large.”145  The judge concluded that “[t]o the extent
that he viewed pornography obsessively, the great majority of it was
adult pornography.”146  However, it is hard to imagine that if a defendant
were caught with a large quantity of illegal drugs that the fact that the 
same defendant had a larger quantity of legal drugs would change the 
nature and circumstances of the offense as it relates to the illegal drugs. 
Some judges and scholars have noted that under the Guidelines, a 
defendant who is prosecuted for a contact offense or for seeking to 
engage in sexual acts with a child can receive a shorter sentence than a
defendant who is prosecuted for possessing child pornography.147 This
discrepancy has been used as part of the reasoning for imposing a
sentence below the range recommended by the Guidelines.148  However, 
to the extent that it is even accurate,149 it could just as easily indicate a
flaw in the sentences for contact offenses.150  In other words, it supports
the argument that sentences for contact offenses should be longer just as 
much as it supports the argument that sentences related to child
pornography offenses should be shorter.151  Some judges compare the
sentence recommended by the Guidelines to the sentence the defendant 
would receive in state court for committing a contact offense.152  This is
144. Id.  Ironically, the highest offense level enhancement related to the number of 
images in the child pornography Guidelines is a five-level enhancement when the offense
involves “600 or more images.”  U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2G2.2(b)(7) 
(2010). 
145. Grober, 595 F. Supp. 2d at 404.  Most of Grober’s pornography collection was 
legal adult pornography. Id.
146. Id.
147. See United States v. Hanson, 561 F. Supp. 2d 1004, 1011 n.1 (E.D. Wis. 
2008); Hansen, supra note 31, at 58. 
148. See Hanson, 561 F. Supp. 2d at 1011 n.1.
149. See United States v. Duhon, 440 F.3d 711, 718–19 (5th Cir. 2006) (discussing 
that if Duhon had solicited a minor for sex, his Guidelines range would have been five
times greater than the recommended range based on his conviction for possession of 
child pornography), vacated, 552 U.S. 1088 (2008); GELBER, supra note 31, at 9 (“Looking at
the statutory punishments and sentencing recommendations under the Sentencing Guidelines,
[this] argument falls apart.  With few exceptions, the statutory penalties and
minimum recommended sentences for . . . child molestation, and child enticement are higher 
than those for child pornography trafficking and possession for first time offenders.”). 
 150. Hansen, supra note 31, at 59 (“[U.S. Attorney Timothy W. Funnell] concedes 
that the typical penalties for child porn offenses tend to be more severe than those for 
contact offenses.  But if that’s the case, he says, the solution is to increase the penalties 
for contact offenses, not to lower the penalties for child porn crimes.”). 
151. See id.
152. United States v. Kustrzyk, No. 05-80216, 2007 WL 45929, at *7 (E.D. Mich. 
Jan. 4, 2007). 
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probably because most contact offenses are tried in state court.153 One
could argue, however, that the Guidelines should aim to set a standard
that state courts could use as a benchmark when imposing sentences for 
contact offenses.
When imposing a below-the-Guidelines-range sentence in a child 
pornography case, district court judges often discuss the fact that there is 
no evidence that the defendant sexually abused any children or
committed a more serious child pornography offense.154  Essentially, the
153. See Robert F. Thompson III, Character Evidence and Sex Crimes in the 
Federal Courts: Recent Developments, 21 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 241, 249 (1999)
(“Because most sex crimes are prosecuted in state court, the new Federal Rules of 
Evidence allowing character evidence into sex-crime cases will probably have a limited 
impact on practicing criminal lawyers in Arkansas.”).
154. See, e.g., United States v. Stall, 581 F.3d 276, 280 (6th Cir. 2009) (discussing 
the statements made by the district court judge); United States v. Baird, 580 F. Supp. 2d
889, 893 (D. Neb. 2008); United States v. Grober, 595 F. Supp. 2d 382, 404 (D.N.J. 
2008), aff’d, 624 F.3d 592 (3d Cir. 2010); United States v. Shipley, 560 F. Supp. 2d 739, 
744 (S.D. Iowa 2008); United States v. Wachowiak, 412 F. Supp. 2d 958, 960 (E.D. Wis. 
2006), aff’d, 496 F.3d 744 (7th Cir. 2007).  In United States v. Stall, the sentencing judge 
stressed that there was no evidence the defendant committed a more serious crime,
specifically, distribution of child pornography or sexual abuse.  581 F.3d at 280.  The 
fact that there was no evidence Stall committed other crimes is not surprising.  See id. at
277 (stating that Stall pleaded guilty to two counts of possession).  Stall was only convicted
of, and being sentenced for, possession of child pornography, and thus investigators were
not concerned with gathering evidence related to these more serious crimes. See id.
In United States v. Pauley, the defendant teacher was convicted of possession after he 
paid an eighth grade student to take nude photographs of herself on more than one 
occasion.  511 F.3d 468, 469 (4th Cir. 2007).  The sentencing court gave the defendant a
below-the-Guidelines-range sentence, which the Fourth Circuit affirmed under the abuse 
of discretion standard. Id. at 469, 474.  The district court concluded that a number of
factors related to the nature and circumstances of the offense were relevant in this case, 
including the fact “that no other child pornography was found in Pauley’s house” and
that he was “less culpable because the victim’s face did not appear in any of the
photographs.”  Id. at 474. 
The defendant in United States v. Riley received the statutory minimum sentence of 
sixty months in prison for transportation of child pornography even though the 
Guidelines recommended a sentence of 210 to 240 months.  655 F. Supp. 2d 1298, 1306 
(S.D. Fla. 2009).  The defendant sent child pornography images over the Internet and
told a person he thought was the mother of a minor child—who turned out to be an FBI 
agent—that he wanted to engage in sexual activity with her daughter. Id. at 1299.  Two 
of the four images that the defendant sent the agent depicted children five years old or 
younger being forced to engage in sexual activity with adult males.  Id.  FBI agents
discovered nine hundred additional images and ten videos of child pornography in the 
defendant’s possession.  Id.  Nevertheless, when discussing the offense, the district court 
judge stated that “[t]he defendant did not harm a child and did not engage in the
production or sale of child pornography.”  Id. at 1305. 
In United States v. Cruikshank, the defendant was convicted of possession after 
investigators found “986 images of suspected child pornography” on the defendant’s 
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characterization of the offense is partially based on the absence of a
more serious offense.155  In reviewing the sentence in United States v. 
Wachowiak, the Seventh Circuit expressed its concern regarding the 
judge’s reliance on the lack of evidence related to other crimes.156  The 
Seventh Circuit said the judge’s “reliance on the fact that the defendant 
did not commit a more serious crime” was questionable, and the court 
emphasized the fact that “the judge’s duty is to address the crime the 
defendant did commit.”157  Rewarding defendants for not committing 
more serious crimes goes against the basic premise that people should be
punished for the crimes they actually commit.158 
2.  The History and Characteristics of the Defendant 
Under the sentencing statute, one of the enumerated factors deals with
the characteristics of the individual defendant.159  Although every
sentencing court must consider this factor, district court judges who
ultimately impose a sentence below the Guidelines range tend to rely on 
the defendant’s positive characteristics in order to justify their ultimate
sentencing determination.160 The fact that a defendant has a family, has
computer.  667 F. Supp. 2d 697, 698–99 (S.D. W. Va. 2009). The district court sentenced the
defendant below the Guidelines range.  See id.  The court made the following statement
in explaining the sentence:
Some of the images he viewed portrayed very young children, some under ten 
years of age.  Notably, however, Mr. Cruikshank did not save these images to
the hard drive of his computer.  He did not email them, distribute them via 
peer-to-peer software, upload them, trade them, or otherwise show them
to anyone else.
Id. at 699. 
155. See, e.g., Grober, 595 F. Supp. 2d at 404 (“The government did not charge 
Grober with any contact behavior; there is not a shred of evidence that he harmed children by
any means beyond his voyeuristic behavior.”); United States v. McElheney, 630 F. Supp. 2d
886, 899 (E.D. Tenn. 2009) (noting that although the defendant continued to download 
child pornography after his indictment, he did not produce it, and there was not any
evidence that he committed a contact offense).
156. See Wachowiak, 496 F.3d at 753. 
157. Id.  The Seventh Circuit also emphasized that “the Sentencing Commission
sets and adjusts the guidelines ranges with the specific objective of achieving proportionality 
in sentencing for crimes of differing severity.” Id. 
158. See id.  For example, in sentencing a defendant convicted of assault, it would 
seem inappropriate to discuss the fact that there was not any evidence that he committed 
murder or to reward him for not killing the person he assaulted.  Cf. United States v. 
Camiscione, 591 F.3d 823, 834 (6th Cir. 2010) (“[I]t is not logical to justify a more
lenient sentence on the basis that [the defendant] did not make or distribute child 
pornography or molest a child.”). 
159. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1) (2006) (stating that the sentencing court must 
consider “the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics 
of the defendant”). 
160. See, e.g., United States v. Duhon, 440 F.3d 711, 715 (5th Cir. 2006) (concluding that
although the district court certainly took the characteristics of the defendant into
646
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a good job, or is well educated might be part of the reason that some 
defendants receive a lower sentence.161 The absence of prior criminal
convictions and the defendant’s good standing in the community also
appear to play a role in the sentencing process.162 Most child 
pornography defendants are white males, and many are in fact well
educated.163  Additionally, pedophiles are often strangers to the criminal
justice system, and many are married.164 Therefore, if the characteristics
mentioned play a role in the sentencing determination, many defendants 
will receive a lower sentence for characteristics that do not appear to be
very unique to the individual defendant.165 
account—in determining that a noncustodial sentence was appropriate—it failed to give 
due consideration to the other enumerated factors), vacated, 552 U.S. 1088 (2008);
United States v. Baird, 580 F. Supp. 2d 889, 892–93, 895 (D. Neb. 2008) (noting that the 
defendant was “intelligent and well educated,” and giving him a sentence thirty-nine 
months below the low end of the Guidelines range); United States v. Shipley, 560 
F. Supp. 2d 739, 743–44 (S.D. Iowa 2008) (noting that the court received letters that the 
defendant—husband and father of two—was “an intelligent, patient, and honorable 
man,” before imposing a sentence 120 months below the low end of the Guidelines 
range); see also GELBER, supra note 31, at 7 (“In child pornography cases . . . there is a 
distressing tendency to place greater emphasis on a defendant’s outer appearance of normalcy
than on his criminal conduct, which can lead to an under-estimation of their danger and 
an over-estimation of their capacity for rehabilitation.”). 
161. See  STANTON WHEELER ET AL., SITTING IN JUDGMENT: THE SENTENCING OF
WHITE-COLLAR CRIMINALS 106–07, 161 (1988) (discussing how the characteristics of the 
typical white collar criminal make sentencing him more difficult and how it is harder for 
judges to sentence people who—aside from the crime they commit—are similar to
themselves).
162. See, e.g., United States v. Grober, 595 F. Supp. 2d 382, 404 (D.N.J. 2008) 
(stating that the defendant had not been charged with any contact behavior and noting the 
abundance of community support as part of the reason for giving the statutory minimum 
of five years), aff’d, 624 F.3d 592 (3d Cir. 2010); see also Berman, supra note 89, at 621 
(discussing the fact that—due to the discretionary power provided by Booker—many
judges started to take offender characteristics into account).
163. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, BULLETIN:
FEDERAL PROSECUTION OF CHILD SEX EXPLOITATION OFFENDERS 5 (2006), http://www.
ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/fpcseo06.pdf.  In 2006, approximately 90% of the suspects 
charged with child pornography were white males and more than half of them had attended
college. Id.
164. See id. at 5 tbl.6 (showing that approximately 80% of child pornography
defendants had no prior felony convictions); see also United States v. Lychock, 578 F.3d 
214, 220 (3d Cir. 2009) (“[L]ack of criminal history is typical of individuals convicted 
for possession of child pornography.”); HOLMES & HOLMES, supra note 18, at 101 
(noting that pedophiles often have no criminal records and are married).
165. See, e.g., United States v. McElheney, 524 F. Supp. 2d 983, 997 (E.D. Tenn. 
2007) (“Typically, defendants in these cases are first offenders, highly educated, middle 
aged, with solid work histories.”), vacated, 310 F. App’x 857 (6th Cir. 2009). 
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Even when the Guidelines were mandatory, sentencing disparities based 
on race, education, and income were present in the federal courts.166   A
district court judge could depart from the Guidelines if there was “an 
aggravating or mitigating circumstance” that the judge believed had not
been adequately considered by the Commission.167  Using a defendant’s
socioeconomic status or race in determining a sentence was expressly
prohibited.168  Additionally, under the once-mandatory Guidelines, family
support, the defendant’s level of education, and the defendant’s work
history were generally irrelevant in determining whether a departure was 
appropriate.169  Now that the Guidelines are advisory, however, family
support, education, and work history are highly relevant in some cases.170 
One judge said that one of the defendant’s personal characteristics that 
favored giving him a noncustodial sentence was his intelligence,171 
and another judge emphasized the fact that the defendant was “intelligent 
and well educated.”172  It is troubling to think that someone who is not
extremely intelligent or well educated, or who does not have the most 
noteworthy work history, would be sentenced more harshly based on 
these factors, which are seemingly unrelated to the offense.173  Additionally, 
many district courts seem to give weight to the defendant’s good job and
166. David B. Mustard, Racial, Ethnic, and Gender Disparities in Sentencing: 
Evidence from the U.S. Federal Courts, 44 J.L. & ECON. 285, 285–86, 308 (2001) 
(discussing how even under the Sentencing Reform Act—which was supposed to
eliminate disparities based on race, education, and income—major discrepancies still
exist).
167. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1) (2006). 
168. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5H1.10 (2010). 
169. See id. § 5H1.6 (family ties and responsibilities); id. § 5H1.5 (employment 
record); id. § 5H1.2 (education and vocational skills).  “Education and vocational skills 
are not ordinarily relevant in determining whether a departure is warranted, but the extent to
which a defendant may have misused special training or education to facilitate criminal 
activity is an express guideline factor.”  Id. § 5H1.2 (citing id. § 3B1.3 (abuse of position 
of trust or use of special skill)).  “Education and vocational skills may be relevant in 
determining the conditions of probation or supervised release for rehabilitative purposes,
for public protection by restricting activities that allow for the utilization of a certain
skill, or in determining the appropriate type of community service.” Id.
170. See, e.g., United States v. Stall, 581 F.3d 276, 280 (6th Cir. 2009)
(emphasizing that the defendant had been “gainfully employed prior to his arrest, and
had done well in school”); United States v. Autery, 555 F.3d 864, 867 (9th Cir. 2009) 
(affirming a below-the-Guidelines sentence of five years of probation).  The district court 
“thought it critical that Autery enjoys the continuing support of his family, especially his 
wife and children.” Id. at 868. 
171. See Autery, 555 F.3d at 868 (noting that the defendant is “motivated and
intelligent” and rejecting the government’s contention that it was inappropriate to consider
these factors).
172. United States v. Baird, 580 F. Supp. 2d 889, 893 (D. Neb. 2008). 
173. See Mustard, supra note 166, at 308 (concluding—based on federal sentencing
data—that “those with low levels of education and income are less likely to receive
downward departures and more likely to receive upward adjustments compared to their 
counterparts”).
648
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education, and then also give defendants leniency because they already lost
so much when people discovered they committed this offense.174 
The personal contact the district court judge has with the defendant, 
coupled with the lack of contact the judge has with most of the victims, 
might be part of the reason the characteristics of the defendant play such 
an important role in the sentencing process.175  Although crime victims
have the right to be present, many of the victims are missing children, 
which means they cannot testify.176  The fact that most child pornography 
defendants are white males, many of whom are educated, gainfully employed, 
and married with children, raises the possibility that some judges have a 
harder time sentencing these defendants.177  In passing the PROTECT 
Act, Congress amended the Guidelines to prohibit judges from considering
family relationships, responsibilities, and ties to the community in cases 
in which the defendant is convicted of a crime related to a minor.178 
174. See Stall, 581 F.3d at 280.  After discussing that the defendant had been 
“gainfully employed prior to his arrest, and had done well in school,” the district court 
turned to the “need to provide just punishment.”  Id.  As the Sixth Circuit noted, “Stall’s 
education and career have been ‘put on hold’ and his fiancée broke off their engagement, 
consequences, the district court implied, that constituted significant punishment.” Id.
Nevertheless, some argue that these personal losses should not decrease the severity of 
the sentence.  See  GELBER, supra note 31, at 7 (“That their fall from grace may have
been more dramatic than other criminals does not mitigate the seriousness of the 
crime.”).
175. See Patrick Fitzgerald, U.S. Att’y, N. Dist. of Ill., Statement Before the U.S.
Sentencing Commission in the Regional Hearing on the State of Federal Sentencing 8
(Sept. 10, 2009) [hereinafter Fitzgerald Statement] (transcript available at http://
ftp.ussc.gov/AGENDAS/20090909/Fitzgerald_testimony.pdf) (stating that it is indeed
possible that “the judges are more lenient because they have less personal contact with 
the victims and see things more through the lens of the defendant standing before the 
judge for sentencing”).
176. See 18 U.S.C. § 3771 (2006) (stating that crime victims have “[t]he right to be 
reasonably heard at any public proceeding in the district court involving release, plea,
sentencing, or any parole proceeding”). 
177. See  WHEELER ET AL., supra note 161, at 161 (discussing how it is hard for
judges to sentence defendants who are seemingly not all that different from themselves);
see also Ernie Allen, President & CEO, Nat’l Ctr. for Missing and Exploited Children, Statement 
Before the U.S. Sentencing Commission in the Regional Hearing on the State of Federal 
Sentencing 8 (Oct. 20, 2009) [hereinafter Allen Statement] (transcript available at http://www.
ussc.gov/Legislative_and_Public_Affairs/Public_Hearings_and_Meetings/20091020-21/Allen
_testimony.pdf) (stating that those prosecuted for child pornography offenses “include 
teachers, lawyers, judges, doctors, coaches, business executives, and elected officials”).
178. See Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools To End the Exploitation of 
Children Today Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-21, § 401(b)(4), 117 Stat. 650, 669 
(amending U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5H1.6 in order to prohibit judges 
from considering family ties and responsibilities when sentencing a defendant convicted
of an offense related to children).
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The Sixth Circuit questioned the sentence imposed by one district 
court, wondering whether the court might “have more readily identified
with the defendant because of his privileged background and the fact
that he attended college,” and whether “this comfort with the defendant 
could have informed its decision not to sentence him to a lengthy term of
imprisonment, as advised by the Guidelines.”179  It is understandable that
judges might have a hard time sentencing people they can relate to,180 
but it seems unfair to give more lenient sentences to those who are arguably
no less culpable than the defendants the judges cannot relate to on a 
personal level.181  Additionally, if some judges take these factors into 
account when others do not, similarly situated defendants end up receiving 
very different sentences.182 
Another problem is that many characteristics of the individual defendant
can have completely opposite results based on the mindset of the judge 
imposing the sentence.183  Former Yale Law School Professor Stanton 
Wheeler interviewed federal district court judges in order to figure out 
the inner-workings of the sentencing process.184  Although Professor
Wheeler’s book focused on white-collar criminals, the findings are
relevant to the discussion of child pornography offenders because of the
demographic similarities and the analogous characteristics of the average
defendants.185 Most of the judges interviewed agreed about the general
qualities that should play a role in assessing character.186  The problem is 
that although some of the judges saw a given characteristic as a reason for
leniency, others viewed the same characteristic as a reason to impose a
more stringent penalty.187 Many argue that the advisory status of the
Guidelines is better for an individual defendant because the characteristics
179. Stall, 581 F.3d at 282. 
180. See WHEELER ET AL., supra note 161, at 161. 
181. See supra Part IV.A.2.
182. See Hearing, supra note 24, at 205–06 (statement of William W. Mercer, U.S. 
Att’y for the District of Montana) (discussing the “troubling trend[]” of “increased inter-
circuit and inter-district sentencing disparity” in the wake of Booker and noting that 
these trends will “only serve to exacerbate disparities among similarly situated 
defendants”). 
183. See WHEELER ET AL., supra note 161, at 102–03 (discussing that although some
judges view certain characteristics as warranting leniency, others view the very
same characteristics as warranting a harsher sentence).
184. See id. at ix.
185. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 163, at 5; WHEELER ET AL., supra note 
161, at 162–63; see also Allen Statement, supra note 177, at 8 (stating that those
prosecuted for child pornography offenses “include teachers, lawyers, judges, doctors, 
coaches, business executives, and elected officials”).
 186. WHEELER ET AL., supra note 161, at 102–03. 
187. See id.
650
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of that individual play a role in determining the sentence.188  In theory, 
this argument is very logical, but it does not appear to fully account for
situations in which similar defendants convicted of the same offense 
receive extremely different sentences.189 Furthermore, it is important to
remember that the Supreme Court only rendered the Guidelines advisory
in order to prevent sentences that are not based on facts found by a jury 
or admitted to by the defendant.190 
3.  The Need for the Sentence Imposed To Reflect the Seriousness of the 
Offense, Deter Criminal Conduct, and Protect the Public        
from Future Crimes of the Defendant 
A district court judge is required to consider “the need for the sentence 
imposed to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for
the law, and to provide just punishment for the offense.”191  These
factors tend to get overlooked in cases in which the defendant receives a
below-the-Guidelines-range or noncustodial sentence, and they are 
essentially ignored when the district court judge does not believe that the
188. See, e.g., Jacqueline A. Johnson, First Assistant Fed. Pub. Defender for the N.
Dist. of Ohio, Statement Before the U.S. Sentencing Commission in a Public Hearing on 
“The Sentencing Reform Act: 25 Years Later” 1–3 (Sept. 10, 2009) (transcript available at 
http://www.ussc.gov/Legislative_and_Public_Affairs/Public_Hearings_and_Meetings/20
090909-10/Johnson_testimony.pdf) (discussing how the advisory Guidelines system 
works better than the mandatory system did, partly because the characteristics of the 
individual defendant play a role).
189. See Harris L. Hartz, Circuit Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit, Statement Before the U.S. Sentencing Commission in the Regional Hearing 
on the State of Federal Sentencing 1 (Oct. 20, 2009) (transcript available at
http://www.ussc.gov/Legislative_and_Public_Affairs/Public_Hearings_and_Meetings/20091
020-21/Hartz_testimony.pdf) (“[W]hen one sees such a diversity of punishment for
indistinguishable offenses, one can question whether the system as a whole is just.”); 
supra note 28. 
190. See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 245–46 (2005) (Breyer, J., 
delivering the opinion of the Court in part); see also Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 64
(2007) (Alito, J., dissenting) (emphasizing that “in reading the Booker remedial opinion,
we should not forget the decision’s constitutional underpinnings”). The Sixth
Amendment problem in Booker was that the “defendant has the right to have a jury, not a
judge, find facts that increase the defendant’s authorized sentence.” Id.  Justice Alito
pointed out that the majority opinion in Gall was really based on “the allocation of
the authority to decide issues of substantive sentencing policy, an issue on which the 
Sixth Amendment says absolutely nothing.”  Id. 
191. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A) (2006). 
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offense is serious.192  The court also must consider “the need for the
sentence imposed to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct.”193 
However, it seems reasonable to question whether a noncustodial sentence
can convey the seriousness of a child pornography offense and whether 
imposing such a sentence deters others from committing future child
pornography offenses.194  Possession cases are the most problematic in this
regard.  Characterizing the possession of child pornography as “mere
viewing” or “mere possession” is disrespectful to child pornography
victims, and it discounts the seriousness of the offense.195  Calling it a
passive act is also inaccurate.196  The offender is not just “open[ing] up
192. See United States v. Duhon, 440 F.3d 711, 714 (5th Cir. 2006) (noting that the 
district court “lamented Congress’s criminalization of possessing child pornography” before
ultimately giving the defendant a noncustodial sentence), vacated, 552 U.S. 1088 (2008). 
193. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(B) (2006). 
194. See Duhon, 440 F.3d at 717–19 (discussing how the district court’s comments 
suggest that the court believed the defendant’s offense—possession of child pornography
including images of prepubescent girls being raped—was not serious); see also United
States v. Camiscione, 591 F.3d 823, 824, 834 (6th Cir. 2010) (holding that a sentence of
supervised release and community service failed to provide general deterrence to others). 
In Gall, Justice Alito made the following statement in his dissenting opinion:
Although the Guidelines called for a prison term of at least 30 months, the 
District Court did not require any imprisonment—not one day. The opinion of
the Court makes much of the restrictions and burdens of probation, but in the 
real world there is a huge difference between imprisonment and probation.
Gall, 552 U.S. at 69 (Alito, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
195. See Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-
248, § 501(2)(D), 120 Stat. 587, 623 (“Every instance of viewing images of child 
pornography represents a renewed violation of the privacy of the victims and a repetition
of their abuse.”); United States v. Phinney 599 F. Supp. 2d 1037, 1038, 1046 (E.D. Wis. 
2009) (giving the defendant a well-below-the-Guidelines sentence of six months, and
calling the offense “simple possession”); B. Todd Jones, U.S. Att’y, Dist. of Minn., 
Statement Before the U.S. Sentencing Commission in the Regional Hearing on the State of 
Federal Sentencing 7–8 (Oct. 20, 2009) [hereinafter Jones Statement] (transcript available at 
http://ftp.ussc.gov/AGENDAS/20091020/Jones_testimony.pdf) (discussing how one judge 
continued to discount the seriousness of possession by repeatedly calling it “mere
viewing”); Allen Statement, supra note 177, at 7 (discussing how one victim said the 
thought of these men watching her being raped made her “feel like [she] was being raped 
by each and every one of them”).
196. See United States v. Borho, 485 F.3d 904, 914 (6th Cir. 2007) (“In this case, 
like Duhon, the district court gave great weight to the fact that Borho’s conduct was 
largely passive and that there was no indication that he would ever pursue interactive 
behavior with young children.”); see also United States v. Goldberg, 491 F.3d 668, 674 
(7th Cir. 2007) (vacating a noncustodial sentence for procedural errors and substantive 
unreasonableness prior to the standards set forth in Gall). 
In the oral statement, which we just quoted, the grounds on which the judge 
justified the sentence were that the defendant was not a real deviant because he
had committed the crime out of “boredom and stupidity,” . . . and that his life, 
rather than the lives of the small children who had been raped in order to
enable the creation of sadistic child pornography to assist the defendant in
masturbating, was the only “life that I can affect.”
Id. at 671.  Possession increases demand in the market, which leads to the creation of 
more child pornography.  See Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, 
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internet sites and pass[ing] them along.”197  These offenders use crime 
scene videos and photos of children being abused and raped for their 
“personal sexual gratification.”198 
Unfortunately, the seriousness of child pornography is often
overlooked.199 In Duhon, the judge “believed Duhon’s offense was not
harmful to children because Duhon himself did not physically molest
anyone.”200  In reality, these crimes are heinous and harmful.201  Every 
time someone views one of these illegal images, the child depicted is 
revictimized.202  One victim who was raped as a child said she “thought
her pulse would stop” when she found out that videos and images of the 
crime were being viewed.203  In a victim impact statement, she told the
court that thinking about all of “those sick perverts” watching her being
raped made her “feel like [she] was being raped by each and every one 
of them.”204  Although this certainly is not a pleasant thought, the reality
Pub. L. No. 109-248, § 501, 120 Stat. 587, 623; Allen Statement, supra note 177, at 5 
(“[I]t is not difficult to understand the link between the demand for child pornography
images and the actual sexual victimization of children needed to create new images.”). 
197. See United States v. Grober, 595 F. Supp. 2d 382, 405 n.13 (D.N.J. 2008) 
(quoting a neighbor’s description of the “core conduct that [was] being punished so
severely” and showing agreement by saying that it was said by someone “with the 
common sense eyes of a layperson”), aff’d, 624 F.3d 592 (3d Cir. 2010). 
198. See Allen Statement, supra note 177, at 4 (“These libraries of images are
collected and viewed for the offender’s personal sexual gratification and, more
commonly, are traded, shared, and/or sold online to other offenders.”).
199. See United States v. Cunningham, 680 F. Supp. 2d 844, 847 (N.D. Ohio 2010)
(“Child pornography is a vile, heinous crime.  Mention the term to your average American
and he responds with immediate disgust and a sense of unease.  However, once it enters 
the legal system, child pornography undergoes sterilization.  The sterilization goes far beyond 
properly removing emotion from sentencing decisions.  Images are described in the most
clinical sense.  Victims all too often remain nameless.  The only emotions on display are 
those of defendants, sorry that their actions were discovered by law enforcement.”).
200. United States v. Duhon, 440 F.3d 711, 717 (5th Cir. 2006), vacated, 552 U.S. 
1088 (2008). 
201. See Cunningham, 680 F. Supp. 2d at 847 (“Child pornography is a vile, heinous
crime.”); Allen Statement, supra note 177, at 6 (“These images and videos often show
children being penetrated by adult offenders and objects.”).
202. See Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-
248, § 501, 120 Stat. 587, 623; Allen Statement, supra note 177, at 11. For an in-depth
discussion explaining why child pornography is not a victimless crime, see generally
Rogers, supra note 21. 
203. Allen Statement, supra note 177, at 7.
204. Id.
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of the offense and the effect it has on the victims need to be taken into
account by the sentencing judge.205 
Finally, a district court must consider “the need for the sentence
imposed to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant.”206 
Obviously if the judge does not feel the crime is harmful to begin with,
this factor will be discounted.207  Expert testimony plays a major role in
the judge’s determination of whether an individual defendant is likely to 
reoffend.208  Sometimes judges believe that the defendant does not pose
a risk to the public when that defendant does not have a criminal record 
and there is no evidence the defendant committed a contact offense 
against a child.209  Beyond the fact that a defendant’s criminal history is
already taken into account by the Guidelines,210 it is worth noting that a
pedophile generally molests numerous children—some estimate as many
as one hundred—before ever getting caught.211  Additionally, pedophiles
often have no criminal record prior to the first time they are convicted of 
a child-related offense.212 
205. See generally United States v. Fiorella, 602 F. Supp. 2d 1057, 1075 n.8 (N.D. 
Iowa 2009) (“It is easier to overlook the horrors of child pornography when, as is often
the case, the material at issue is not presented to the sentencing judge. . . .  But the 
horrors of child pornography are real even if those who sit in judgment do not have 
occasion to view them.”); Cunningham, 680 F. Supp. 2d at 854 (“Absent examining the 
images, one cannot get a true sense of the depravity that they depict.  Thus, the Court 
implores any reviewing Court to personally examine the images at issue and not simply
rely on a written description of their contents.”).
206. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(C) (2006). 
207. See United States v. Riley, 655 F. Supp. 2d 1298, 1306 (S.D. Fla. 2009) 
(sentencing a defendant convicted of transportation of child pornography with a calculated 
Guidelines range of 210 to 260 months to the statutory minimum of sixty months).  The 
district court judge emphasized that the defendant “sent 3 images of child pornography
over the internet and expressed a desire to engage in sexual activity with a minor child,” 
but at the same time, “[t]he defendant did not harm a child and did not engage in the
production or sale of child pornography.”  Id. at 1305. 
208. See, e.g., United States v. Baird, 580 F. Supp. 2d 889, 894–95 (D. Neb. 2008) 
(concluding that the defendant was not likely to reoffend and “stress[ing] the importance
of opinions of the medical professionals who . . . have determined that he is not likely to 
reoffend and is not a predator”); infra Part IV.C.3.
209. See, e.g., United States v. Grober, 595 F. Supp. 2d 382, 404 (D.N.J. 2008), 
aff’d, 624 F.3d 592 (3d Cir. 2010); United States v. McElheney, 630 F. Supp. 2d 886, 
899 (E.D. Tenn. 2009). 
 210. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 5, pt. A, sentencing tbl. (2010). 
 211. HOLMES & HOLMES, supra note 18, at 100. 
212. Id. at 98. 
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4.  Avoiding Unwarranted Sentencing Disparities 
Congress passed the Sentencing Reform Act in order to deal with the
major sentencing disparities that existed at the time.213  Similar defendants
convicted of the same offense regularly received extremely different
sentences, and the Commission and the Guidelines were part of the plan 
to solve this problem.214 The Guidelines decreased disparity and increased 
transparency in sentencing.215  Under the advisory system, district court 
judges still must consider “the need to avoid unwarranted sentence
disparities among defendants with similar records who have been found
guilty of similar conduct.”216  Nevertheless, sentencing disparities increased 
in the wake of Booker and its progeny, and the most recent data from the
Commission shows that nearly half of the defendants sentenced in fiscal
year 2009 received sentences outside the Guidelines range.217 The
Guidelines became advisory in order to cure the Sixth Amendment violation
that occurred in some cases when the Guidelines were mandatory.218 
The remedial majority wanted to fix the Sixth Amendment problem
while preserving Congress’s goal of “uniformity of sentencing,”219 but 
the current state of affairs indicates that the advisory system is not 
achieving that goal.220 
213. Ilene H. Nagel, Structuring Sentencing Discretion: The New Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines, 80 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 883, 883 (1990). 
214. See id. at 883–84. 
215. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, FIFTEEN YEARS OF GUIDELINES SENTENCING:
AN ASSESSMENT OF HOW WELL THE FEDERAL JUSTICE SYSTEM IS ACHIEVING THE GOALS
OF SENTENCING REFORM, at xvi (2004) (discussing the impact of the Sentencing 
Guidelines and stating that “[s]entencing reform has had its greatest impact controlling
disparity arising from the source at which the guidelines themselves were
targeted—judicial discretion”). 
216. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6) (2006). 
 217. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, FINAL QUARTERLY DATA REPORT 1 tbl.1 (2009)
[hereinafter QUARTERLY DATA REPORT], available at http://www.ussc.gov/Data_and_ 
Statistics/Federal_Sentencing_Statistics/Quarterly_Sentencing_Updates/USSC_2009
_Quarter_Report_Final.pdf.
218. See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 244–46 (2005) (Breyer, J., 
delivering the opinion of the Court in part); supra Part II.C. 
219. Booker, 543 U.S. at 246. 
220. See  QUARTERLY DATA REPORT, supra note 217, at 1 tbl.1. A system that 
increases uniformity more effectively and protects every defendant’s Sixth Amendment 
rights in a way that complies with the substantive holding in Booker is possible.  See
Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 61 (2007) (Souter, J., concurring). 
After Booker’s remedial holding, I continue to think that the best resolution of 
the tension between substantial consistency throughout the system and the right of
jury trial would be a new Act of Congress: reestablishing a statutory system of
 655
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The sentencing data illustrates that many defendants who are charged 
with the same offense and have the same criminal history are sentenced 
very differently.221  Unfortunately, the disparities are even greater when 
it comes to child pornography offenses.222 Less than half of the
defendants sentenced for possession, receipt, transportation, or distribution 
of child pornography received a sentence within the Guidelines range.223 
The Guidelines were necessary because, in “a system claiming equal 
justice for all, disparity was an inexplicable yet constant source of
embarrassment.”224  However, many wonder whether the current system
is essentially the same as the system in place before the Guidelines and 
whether the discretionary system is “unintentionally jeopardizing the 
principle of equal justice under the law.”225 
B.  Appellate Review in Light of the Mandated    
Substantial Deference Standard 
Some people involved in the sentencing process—including judges— 
question whether there is anything left in terms of appellate review.226 
The Fifth Circuit likely did not believe the noncustodial sentence in
Duhon or Rowan was reasonable, but in the wake of Gall, the court was 
handcuffed by its inability to engage in meaningful appellate review.227 
mandatory sentencing guidelines (though not identical to the original in all 
points of detail), but providing for jury findings of all facts necessary to set the
upper range of sentencing discretion. 
Id.  Justice Souter’s argument—that Congress should enact mandatory guidelines that do
not violate the Sixth Amendment—is beyond the scope of this Comment.  The focus of 
this Comment is defendants convicted of child pornography offenses.  However,
the recommendation to amend the child pornography statutes would increase uniformity
among defendants convicted of an offense in violation of §§ 2252 or 2252A.  See infra 
Part V. 
221. See QUARTERLY DATA REPORT, supra note 217, at 1. 
222. See id. at 14 tbl.5. 
223. Id.
 224. Nagel, supra note 213, at 884. 
225. Jones Statement, supra note 195, at 3.
226. See, e.g., United States v. Autery, 555 F.3d 864, 880 (9th Cir. 2009)
(Tashima, J., dissenting) (“Abuse of discretion as now applied in this circuit to the 
substantive review of sentences for reasonableness is nothing more than a standardless 
and empty formalism—it comes close to no appellate review at all.”); United States v.
Wittig, 528 F.3d 1280, 1289 (10th Cir. 2008) (Hartz, J., concurring) (“Under [the]
present approach we may go through the motions of substantive-reasonableness 
review, but it will be an empty gesture.”); David M. Gaouette, U.S. Att’y, Dist. of
Colo., Statement Before the U.S. Sentencing Commission in the Regional Hearing on the
State of Federal Sentencing 3 (Oct. 20, 2009) (transcript available at http://www.
ussc.gov/Legislative_and_Public_Affairs/Public_Hearings_and_Meetings/20091020-
21/Gaoette_testimony.pdf) (“Recent appellate cases suggest that there is little 
meaningful appellate review of sentences.”); supra Part III.B.2. 
227. See supra Part III.B.1–3. 
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Although Gall set up a two-step review process,228 in the absence of a
procedural error, the probability that a case will get remanded is
extremely low.229  Some appellate judges have expressed concern over 
the current review process, saying they do not believe the Supreme Court
intended to give district courts “such extreme deference from courts of 
appeals.”230  Part of the problem is that the Supreme Court did not discuss
the types of situations that would warrant a reversal.231  One appellate
judge described the current state of substantive reasonableness review as 
follows: “[The] present approach appears to be that a sentence is
substantively reasonable if the sentencing judge provides reasons for the 
length of the sentence.”232  Unfortunately, that description appears to be
accurate.233 
1.  Fending Off Remand
Many district court judges avoid remand by writing lengthy memoranda
addressing all of the § 3553(a) factors.234  Doing this seems to make it
almost impossible for the appellate court to say that the sentence was
substantively unreasonable, even if the district court judge obviously
gave much more weight to certain factors.235  For example, the Seventh 
Circuit affirmed a below-the-Guidelines-range sentence after noting that 
228. See supra Part III.B.2.
229. See generally United States v. Grossman, 513 F.3d 592 (6th Cir. 2008); United 
States v. McBride, 511 F.3d 1293 (11th Cir. 2007); United States v. Wachowiak, 496 
F.3d 744 (7th Cir. 2007). 
230. Autery, 555 F.3d at 879 (Tashima, J., dissenting).  The dissent vehemently
objected to the majority’s affirmation of the district court’s noncustodial sentence. Id. 
231. Id. (“Missing from the majority opinion in Gall, however, is any discussion of
the circumstances under which a court of appeals may reverse a district court’s sentence 
as substantively unreasonable.”)
232. United States v. Wittig, 528 F.3d 1280, 1289 (10th Cir. 2008) (Hartz, J., 
concurring).  Judge Hartz proposes a different approach, whereby the appellate court 
would focus on two of the § 3553(a) factors: the sentencing range in the Guidelines and
the need to avoid unwarranted disparities. Id. These two factors
should be a matter of concern to appellate courts that wish to effectuate 
congressional intent that we be a nation of equal justice under law, in which 
the length of time that a defendant is deprived of liberty does not depend primarily
and significantly on who the sentencing judge happens to be. 
Id.
233. See infra Part IV.B.1.
234. See, e.g., United States v. Grober, 595 F. Supp. 2d 382 (D.N.J. 2008), aff’d, 
624 F.3d 592 (3d Cir. 2010); United States v. Hanson, 561 F. Supp. 2d 1004 (E.D. Wis. 
2008). 
235. See United States v. Wachowiak, 496 F.3d 744, 749, 753–54 (7th Cir. 2007). 
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the district court judge “carefully and at length explained his choice of
a 70-month sentence over a guidelines sentence.”236 The court expressed 
concern regarding the judge’s reliance on certain factors and disagreed
with some of the judge’s “reasons for selecting a below-guidelines
sentence.”237  Ultimately, however, the court decided the sentence was 
substantively reasonable, mostly because the judge “methodically worked 
through the statute” in determining the sentence.238 
If the district court fails to offer a reasoned explanation for the 
sentence imposed, the decision might be subject to remand.239  However,
the appellate court cannot remand the case even if it disagrees with the 
reasoning and would have sentenced the defendant differently.240  In  
United States v. Grober, the district court judge set forth her reasons for
imposing a sentence at the statutory minimum in a twenty-nine page 
opinion.241 The opinion was deemed a “must read” for defense attorneys,
partly because of its “thorough and almost exhaustive explanation of the 
sentence imposed.”242  In light of the current standard of review, a
lengthy explanation that goes through all of the factors enumerated in 
§ 3553(a) is the key ingredient to fending off remand.243 
236. Id. at 750. 
237. Id. at 753–54. 
238. Id.
239. See United States v. Morace, 594 F.3d 340, 350 (4th Cir. 2010) (concluding
that the circumstances surrounding the defendant’s case did not appear to be unusual and 
holding “that the court erred by failing to provide an adequate explanation of why a term
of imprisonment is not warranted”); United States v. Lychock, 578 F.3d 214, 220 (3d Cir.
2009) (concluding that the district court put the substantive reasonableness of its decision
at risk by “ignoring relevant factors and failing to offer a reasoned explanation for its 
departure from the Guidelines”).  Some appellate courts have deemed a district court’s
failure “to consider all of the § 3553(a) factors” a problem related to “the procedural 
reasonableness of the sentence.” Morace, 594 F.3d at 349 n.7. However, not offering a 
reasoned explanation appears to present a procedural and substantive problem. See Lychock, 
578 F.3d at 216, 218 (holding that the imposition of a probationary sentence in a case in 
which the defendant knowingly possessed 150–300 images of child pornography “was 
procedurally and substantively unreasonable” due to the district court’s failure to “offer a
sufficient justification”).
240. See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007) (“The fact that the appellate 
court might reasonably have concluded that a different sentence was appropriate is 
insufficient to justify reversal of the district court.”); Wachowiak, 496 F.3d at 754
(concluding that even though it might agree with the government that a sentence of “70 
months does not adequately reflect the seriousness of Wachowiak’s offense,” the “task
[of an appellate court] on reasonableness review is limited”).
241. See United States v. Grober, 595 F. Supp. 2d 382, 383–415 (D.N.J. 2008)
(including three pages of appendices), aff’d, 624 F.3d 592 (3d Cir. 2010). 
 242. Christopher R. Clifton, Procuring the Parsimony Provision of § 3553(a) 
Through Expert and Lay Witnesses, CHAMPION, Apr. 2009, at 53, 53–54. 
243. See United States v. Wittig, 528 F.3d 1280, 1289 (10th Cir. 2008) (Hartz, J., 
concurring). 
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2.  Attempting To Engage in Meaningful Appellate Review 
Despite the current standard of appellate review, some appellate courts 
have found a way to remand in the absence of a procedural error.244 In 
United States v. Pugh, the Eleventh Circuit held that even under the most 
recent Supreme Court precedent, the district court abused its discretion 
when it gave the defendant a noncustodial sentence.245  The court
recognized that the case tested the “nature and extent of appellate review”
but ultimately concluded that it could not give deference to the district 
court’s decision.246 
The defendant in Pugh downloaded numerous images and videos of
child pornography.247  One of the videos was of an infant being raped.248 
The defendant pleaded guilty to possession, and the Guidelines
recommended a prison sentence of 97 to 120 months.249  The district 
court decided that five years of probation was a more appropriate
sentence.250  The defendant admitted that he pretended to be a young 
girl in online chat rooms and that he sent child pornography to other 
people.251  However, the district court relied on expert testimony that the
defendant was not likely to reoffend and that he was addicted to adult
pornography as opposed to child pornography.252  The defendant voluntarily
entered into treatment for his addiction to adult pornography, and 
continuing treatment was a condition of his probation-only sentence.253 
Ultimately, the Eleventh Circuit could not see how a probationary sentence 
could “promote general deterrence, reflect the seriousness of Pugh’s
offense, [or] show respect for the law.”254  Thus, the court concluded that
the sentence was unreasonable.255 
244. See, e.g., United States v. Abu Ali, 528 F.3d 210, 258–69 (4th Cir. 2008) 
(holding that a below-the-Guidelines thirty-year sentence in the terrorism-related case 
was substantively unreasonable); United States v. Pugh, 515 F.3d 1179, 1202 (11th Cir. 
2008) (holding that a sentence of probation was substantively unreasonable). 






251. See id. at 1187 & n.5.
252. Id. at 1187. 
253. Id.
254. Id. at 1183.  The Sixth Circuit reached a similar conclusion in United States v. 
Camiscione.  591 F.3d 823, 834 (6th Cir. 2010). The defendant pleaded guilty to possession 
of child pornography and the Guidelines recommended a sentence of twenty-seven to 
 659




































Some criticized the Eleventh Circuit’s decision and indicated that the 
court misunderstood its role in terms of appellate review.256  However, it 
seems unlikely that the Supreme Court would set forth a two-step
process of review if the second step—substantive reasonableness
review—could only lead to a single result.257  Indeed, some argue that
the review process should only consist of a review for procedural errors.258 
Nevertheless, the current precedent consists of a bifurcated standard of 
review.259  The Eleventh Circuit refused to “read Supreme Court precedent 
as having so eviscerated appellate review at the same time that it has
mandated the appellate courts to continue to review sentences for 
reasonableness.”260  The court pointed out that if it could not hold that
the defendant’s sentence in Pugh was unreasonable, it would “come
perilously close to holding that appellate review is limited to procedural 
irregularity.”261 
thirty-three months in prison.  Id. at 824.  Instead of imposing a custodial sentence, the 
district court sentenced the defendant to a period of supervised release and ordered him 
to do 180 hours of community service.  Id.  On appeal, the Sixth Circuit found the
sentence “procedurally reasonable but substantively unreasonable because the district 
court failed to explain adequately how its sentence ‘deterred [the defendant] from committing
future crimes.’”  Id. at 825. On remand, the district court “held two sentencing hearings, 
ordered a comprehensive psychological evaluation at a federal facility, delivered a 
written opinion, and deliberated extensively over its sentencing decision,” id. at 833, but 
ultimately “reimposed the original sentence,” id. at 824.  The Sixth Circuit once again 
concluded that the sentence was substantively unreasonable because the district court did
not “adequately consider or justify how its sentence promoted general deterrence or 
avoided unwarranted sentence disparities.” Id. at 833. 
255. Pugh, 515 F.3d at 1183. 
256. See Lindsay C. Harrison, Appellate Discretion and Sentencing After Booker,
62 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1115, 1144–52 (2008) (concluding that the court in Pugh failed to 
give the appropriate amount of discretion to the district court’s sentence in the wake of 
recent Supreme Court precedents).
257. See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007) (setting forth a bifurcated
appellate review process).
258. See Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 370 (2007) (Scalia, J., concurring)
(“I would hold that reasonableness review cannot contain a substantive component at 
all.”); David C. Holman, Death by a Thousand Cases: After Booker, Rita, and 
Gall, the Guidelines Still Violate the Sixth Amendment, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 267, 
303 (2008) (arguing that substantive reasonableness review should be prohibited). 
259. See Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. 
260. Pugh, 515 F.3d at 1204. 
261. Id. at 1203.  Approximately two-and-a-half years after deciding Pugh, the 
Eleventh Circuit held that the sentence imposed by the district court judge in United
States v. Irey was substantively unreasonable.  See United States v. Irey, 612 F.3d 1160, 
1225 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc).  In Irey, the defendant pleaded guilty to one count of 
“knowingly employ[ing], us[ing], persuad[ing], induc[ing], entic[ing], and coerc[ing]
minors to engage in sexually explicit conduct” in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2251(c). Id. at 
1168–69.  He admitted to making trips overseas to have sex with minors and producing
child pornography, which he transported back to the United States.  Id. at 1169.  The 
details of the defendant’s crime were horrific, see id. at 1166–68, and the range 
recommended by the Guidelines ended up being higher than the statutory maximum, id. 
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C.  Criticisms of the Justifications for Non-Guidelines
Sentences 
1.  Policy Disagreements and the Absence of the        
Empirical Approach 
Several post-Booker Supreme Court cases—all involving drug 
offenses—have had an enormous impact on how district court judges 
treat the Guidelines in child pornography cases.262 Numerous district
courts have relied on Kimbrough v. United States,263 which held that
district court judges could categorically reject the crack-cocaine
Guidelines based on policy disagreements,264 to support their decision to
at 1169–70.  Therefore, the Guidelines range became the statutory maximum, which was
thirty years. Id.  However, the district court judge decided that a seventeen-and-a-half
year sentence was more appropriate.  See id. at 1179.  The Eleventh Circuit decided the 
sentence was substantively unreasonable mostly “because of the nature and extent of [the 
defendant’s] criminal conduct.”  Id. at 1166.  The court made the following closing 
remarks: 
Because of the substantial deference district courts are due in sentencing, we
give their decisions about what is reasonable wide berth and almost always let 
them pass.  There is a difference, though, between recognizing that another 
usually has the right of way and abandoning one’s post.  We will not quit the 
post that we have been ordered to hold in sentencing review and the 
responsibility that goes with it. . . . 
In this case the district court made a substantive mistake, a clear error in
judgment, by unreasonably varying downward from the advisory guidelines 
sentence when no sentence less than it is sufficient to fulfill the purposes set
forth in the Sentencing Reform Act.  To do our duty to correct that mistake, we
vacate the sentence the district court imposed and remand with instructions 
that the defendant is to be resentenced within the guidelines range.
Id. at 1225. 
262. See Gall, 552 U.S. at 49–51 (holding that appellate courts must give due 
deference to a district court’s sentencing decision); Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85,
101 (2007) (holding that the district court was entitled to categorically reject the crack-
cocaine Guidelines “based solely on policy considerations”); Spears v. United States, 
129 S. Ct. 840, 843 (2009) (per curiam) (reaffirming the holding in Kimbrough).  The 
Supreme Court decided Kimbrough on the same day it decided Gall.  In Kimbrough, the
Court quoted a government brief, which essentially conceded that due to the advisory
nature of the Guidelines, district courts could impose non-Guidelines sentences “based
solely on policy considerations, including disagreements with the Guidelines.”  552 U.S.
at 101. 
263. 552 U.S. 85. 
264. See id. at 101.  This holding was clarified and reaffirmed in Spears, 129 S. Ct. 
at 843–44, but even before Spears, 
numerous district courts had read Kimbrough to permit a sentencing court to 
give little deference to the guideline for child pornography cases on the ground 
that the guideline did not exemplify the Sentencing Commission’s exercise of 
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give little deference to the child pornography Guidelines.265  In Kimbrough, 
the district court’s authority to reject the crack-cocaine Guidelines was
based on the premise that “those Guidelines do not exemplify the
Commission’s exercise of its characteristic institutional role”266 and the
fact that the Commission did not use the empirical approach267 in 
developing the Guidelines for drug trafficking offenses.268 
In imposing a below-the-Guidelines-range sentence, many district
courts categorically reject or otherwise dismiss the child pornography
Guidelines as being the product of congressional directives as opposed 
to the empirical approach.269  However, some who criticize the child
pornography Guidelines for not being based on the Commission’s 
institutional role simultaneously indicate that few Guidelines actually are 
and note that even the empirical approach initially used by the Commission 
was inherently flawed.270  Instead of relying on the Guidelines, many 
district courts rely on, and in some cases discuss at length,271 an article 
its characteristic institutional role and empirical analysis, but was the result of 
congressional mandates, often passed by Congress with little debate or analysis. 
United States v. Beiermann, 599 F. Supp. 2d 1087, 1100 (N.D. Iowa 2009). 
265. See, e.g., United States v. Hanson, 561 F. Supp. 2d 1004, 1009–11 (E.D. Wis. 
2008); United States v. Shipley, 560 F. Supp. 2d 739, 744 (S.D. Iowa 2008); United 
States v. Baird, 580 F. Supp. 2d 889, 892–94 (D. Neb. 2008). 
266. Kimbrough, 552 U.S. at 109. 
267. The Court explained the empirical approach in Rita v. United States as follows:
“[T]he Commission took an ‘empirical approach,’ beginning with an empirical 
examination of 10,000 presentence reports setting forth what judges had done in 
the past and then modifying and adjusting past practice in the interests of greater 
rationality, avoiding inconsistency, complying with congressional instructions, and the 
like.”  551 U.S. 338, 349 (2007). 
268. Kimbrough, 552 U.S. at 96. 
269. See, e.g., United States v. Riley, 655 F. Supp. 2d 1298, 1303–04 (S.D. Fla. 2009); 
United States v. McElheney, 630 F. Supp. 2d 886, 891–96 (E.D. Tenn. 2009); Beiermann, 
599 F. Supp. 2d at 1104; United States v. Phinney, 599 F. Supp. 2d 1037, 1041–43 (E.D. 
Wis. 2009); United States v. Grober, 595 F. Supp. 2d 382, 390–94 (D.N.J. 2008), aff’d, 
624 F.3d 592 (3d Cir. 2010); United States v. Johnson, 588 F. Supp. 2d 997, 1003–04
(S.D. Iowa 2008); United States v. Rausch, 570 F. Supp. 2d 1295, 1297–98 (D. Colo. 
2008); United States v. Ontiveros, No. 07-CR-333, 2008 WL 2937539, at *8 (E.D. Wis.
July 24, 2008); Hanson, 561 F. Supp. 2d at 1009–11; Shipley, 560 F. Supp. 2d at 744;
Baird, 580 F. Supp. 2d at 892–95. 
270. See Lynn Adelman & Jon Deitrich, Improving the Guidelines Through Critical
Evaluation: An Important New Role for District Courts, 57 DRAKE L. REV. 575, 578–80
(2009) (arguing that very few of the Guidelines are worthy of respect due to the fact that 
when the Commission drafted the Guidelines, “it had limited data concerning past 
practice, and the data it did have was sketchy”). 
271. For example, in United States v. Hanson, the district court judge discussed and
quoted the article at length.  561 F. Supp. 2d at 1009–11.  He decided that “[he] could
not conclude that under the circumstances of this case, given all of the flaws in the
guideline discussed above, that the range deserved deference.”  Id. at 1011; see Hansen,
supra note 31, at 54–56 (“[Judge] Adelman devoted much of his opinion in U.S. v. 
Hanson to what was then a just-published critique of the child porn guidelines by an 
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written by public defender Troy Stabenow.272  Stabenow’s article illustrates
the changes to the child pornography Guidelines over the years and 
ultimately concludes that these changes “should persuade and embolden 
the courts to conclude that unless a defendant was a repeat offender, or a 
mass distributor, the Guidelines yield a sentence ‘greater than necessary’
to achieve § 3553(a)’s purposes.”273  Nevertheless, even if the child
pornography Guidelines are the result of congressional directives, it is
still possible that the directives might in fact be the will of the people.274 
2.  Rejecting Various Enhancements that Apply to the  
Majority of Defendants 
Critics of the child pornography Guidelines often contend that the 
Guidelines are flawed because many of the enhancements enumerated in 
section 2G2.2 apply to most defendants.275  The result is that a large
number of defendants end up with a Guidelines range close to the statutory 
maximum.276  Critics recognize that Congress and the Commission realized
that a number of these enhancements would apply in a large number of
assistant federal defender . . . whose findings have since been cited by at least five other 
federal judges.”). 
 272. Troy Stabenow, Deconstructing the Myth of Careful Study: A Primer on the 
Flawed Progression of the Child Pornography Guidelines, FED. DEFENDER (Jan. 1,
2009), www.fd.org/pdf_lib/child porn july revision.pdf; see Riley, 655 F. Supp. 2d at 
1300–02; McElheney, 630 F. Supp. 2d at 892; Beiermann, 599 F. Supp. 2d at 1100; 
Phinney, 599 F. Supp. 2d at 1041–43; Grober, 595 F. Supp. 2d at 390–94; Johnson, 588
F. Supp. 2d at 1003–04; Ontiveros, 2008 WL 2937539, at *8; Hanson, 561 F. Supp. 2d 
at 1009–11. 
 273. Stabenow, supra note 272, at 38. 
274. See United States v. Stone, 575 F.3d 83, 87 (1st Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S.
Ct. 1115 (2010). 
In many ways, the fact that the guidelines are a direct reflection of a congressional 
expression of popular will is an argument in favor, not against the imposition 
of a guideline sentence.  Congress is, after all, the elected representatives of the 
people of this country, and [] it has made policy choices about this type of crime, 
and those choices are reflected in the guideline range.  It is not this court’s 
constitutional role to second-guess congressional policy decisions simply 
because they’re expressed in the guidelines, and it is this court’s constitutional 
role to express the will of the people of this country as expressed by Congress.  
On this crime, the will of the people is . . . exceedingly clear. 
Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Judge John A. Woodcock, U.S. District Court for the 
District of Maine). 
275. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2G2.2 (2010); Adelman & 
Deitrich, supra note 270, at 584–85; Stabenow, supra note 272, at 26–27. 
276. See Adelman & Deitrich, supra note 270, at 584. 
 663
KROHEL FINAL POST-AUTHOR PAGES TO_PRINTER (DO NOT DELETE) 6/14/2011 10:57 AM      
 
 












   
 
     
 
   
    
     
  
 
   
  




   
 
   
 
 




cases,277 and yet many judges cannot believe Congress intended to create a
situation in which “a typical downloader”278 gets a range near the statutory 
maximum.279  Arguably, one could conclude that most defendants are
simply committing more serious offenses that warrant a higher level of
punishment.280 
One of the most frequently criticized enhancements is the two-level
increase that applies if the defendant used a computer to commit
the offense.281 Again, the Commission knew this would apply to a large 
number of defendants.282  Some still criticize this enhancement because 
277. See Stabenow, supra note 272, at 23, 26–27 (noting that the Commission knew 
various enhancements would apply to a large number of offenders (citing U.S.
SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL app. C, amend. 664 (2004)).
278. United States v. Grober, 595 F. Supp. 2d 382, 394 (D.N.J. 2008), aff’d, 624 
F.3d 592 (3d Cir. 2010).  The “typical downloader,” id., or the “average defendant,” 
Stabenow, supra note 272, at 14, 23, is not specifically defined. See United States v.
Cunningham, 680 F. Supp. 2d 844, 852 (N.D. Ohio 2010) (“Stabenow blandly references
the ‘average offender’ when asserting that it is a travesty that sentencing ranges are so high. 
The term ‘average offender,’ however, goes undefined.”).  The court in Cunningham
took the time to examine what exactly Stabenow, and presumably the courts that rely on
his article, meant by “average.” See id. The court made the following observations: 
A closer examination of “average” when used by Stabenow is disturbing.  In
order to chart out at the statutory maximum, a first-time offender must reach an
offense level of 40 prior to acceptance of responsibility.  To reach that level,
the offender must have images of a prepubescent minor (+2 levels), distribute 
the images for value (+5 levels), possess images that are sadistic or masochistic
(+4 levels), use a computer (+2 levels), and either engage in a pattern of abuse 
(+5 levels), or possess more than 600 images (+5 levels).  It is only then that 
an offense level of 40 would be achieved.  With acceptance of responsibility, a 
Guideline range of 210 to 262 months would be computed.  In order to chart 
out above the statutory maximum, offense level 39 or above, the offender 
would need to both possess over 600 images and have engaged in a pattern of 
abuse.  Thus, the term “average offender” is significantly misleading.  Once one
realizes that Stabenow describes an individual owning more than 600 images 
of prepubescent child pornography containing sadistic and masochistic images 
as “average” without any further description, it is somewhat easier to understand 
why he believes the Guidelines are too harsh.
Id.
279. Grober, 595 F. Supp. 2d at 394 (“Surely congress did not intend to provide a 
sentencing range of 19 1/2 to 20 years for a typical downloader, especially one who 
pleads guilty.”).
280. See GELBER, supra note 31, at 13–15 (“If anything, the fact that many of the 
enhancements tend to apply in most cases . . . simply underscores the fact that this crime 
problem has steadily increased in severity, which necessitates meaningful sentences that 
have the deterrent value to shut down the market for this abuse.”).  “The fact that certain 
enhancements apply on a frequent basis does not serve as a basis for negating the 
Guidelines.”  Cunningham, 680 F. Supp. 2d at 852.  “If anything, the fact that more than 
fifty percent of offenders have over 300 images and that over sixty-percent have sadistic and 
masochistic images supports a conclusion that even more harsh sentences are required
for deterrence.”  Id. at 852–53. 
281. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2G2.2(b)(6) (2010). 
282. See Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-
248, § 501, 120 Stat. 587, 623. 
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it applies in most cases.283 However, the Internet has increased the ease 
of access to child pornography, and it has increased the size of the
interstate market.284 
The ease of access to child pornography on the Internet is actually one
reason why the enhancement based on the number of images is criticized.285 
Some have insinuated that there should not be an enhancement based on
the number of images because the Internet makes it so easy to
download a large quantity of child pornography.286  However, the
ease of access on the Internet may actually mean the penalty needs to be 
more severe when the Internet is used in order to deter people.287  In  
Arizona, each image of child pornography constitutes a separate offense,288 
and each individual offense has a mandatory minimum sentence of ten
283. See United States v. Hanson, 561 F. Supp. 2d 1004, 1009 (E.D. Wis. 2008); 
Stabenow, supra note 272, at 15–16. 
284. See Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-
248, § 501, 120 Stat. 587, 623. 
 285. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2G2.2(b)(7)(A)–(D) (2010); see, e.g.,
Hanson, 561 F. Supp. 2d at 1009 (“[G]iven the unfortunate ease of access to this type of
material in the computer age, compiling a collection with hundreds of images is all too 
easy, yet carries a 5 level enhancement . . . .”).
286. See, e.g., Hanson, 561 F. Supp. 2d at 1009 (discussing the enhancement related
to the number of images by emphasizing how easy it is to download a large number of
images); see also United States v. Cunningham, 680 F. Supp. 2d 844, 853 (N.D. Ohio 
2010) (rejecting “[t]he assertion that sentences should be reduced because it is easy to
accumulate a large number of pictures quickly”).
287. United States v. Goldberg, 491 F.3d 668, 672 (7th Cir. 2007) (“The logic of 
deterrence suggests that the lighter the punishment for downloading and uploading child 
pornography, the greater the customer demand for it and so the more will be produced.”).
Deterrence theory is beyond the scope of this Comment.  For an interesting discussion
regarding deterrence, see Douglas A. Berman, Making Deterrence Work Better, in
CRIMINAL LAW CONVERSATIONS, supra note 89, at 118, 119–20 (noting that there is a 
connection between deterrence and education and that “the theory of deterrence demands 
some intellectual sophistication, which in turn suggests that more educated populations 
may respond more cogently to increased punishment”); Paul H. Robinson, The Difficulties of
Deterrence as a Distributive Principle, in  CRIMINAL LAW CONVERSATIONS, supra note
89, at 105, 105–16 (questioning the use of deterrence as a distributive principle and
concluding that it should only be considered when there is a reason to think “that the 
prerequisites for a deterrent effect exist”); Russell D. Covey, Deterrence’s Complexity,
in  CRIMINAL LAW CONVERSATIONS, supra note 89, at 116, 117 (noting that figuring out 
the “expected costs and benefits in a way that is likely to maximize the deterrent function 
of criminal law is extremely difficult”); Doron Teichman, In Defense of Deterrence, in
CRIMINAL LAW CONVERSATIONS, supra note 89, at 120, 120–22 (arguing that deterrence 
should be part of criminal sanctions because criminal laws affect how potential criminals 
behave).
288. Arizona v. Berger, 134 P.3d 378, 379 (Ariz. 2006). 
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years in prison if the child depicted is less than fifteen years old.289 
Moreover, the fact that the crime is easy to commit does not seem like a 
good reason for leniency.290 For example, it seems hard to imagine giving 
leniency to someone who uses a gun to commit murder even though 
pulling a trigger is a quick and seemingly easy way to kill a person.291 
Therefore, the fact that defendants are able to download a large number
of images in a short period of time, and with a minimal amount of effort, 
does not appear to make them less culpable than they would be if it were 
more difficult or time consuming to acquire an exorbitant amount of 
illegal material.292 
Two other enhancements that receive an abundance of criticism are 
those that apply if the material (1) involves a prepubescent minor under 
the age of twelve,293 or (2) “portrays sadistic or masochistic conduct or
other depictions of violence.”294  Some judges and critics say the
289. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3553(C) (2010) (“Sexual exploitation of a 
minor is a class 2 felony and if the minor is under fifteen years of age it is punishable 
pursuant to § 13-705.”); id. § 13-705(D) (listing a ten-year minimum term of
imprisonment for a person who is guilty of possession who has not been previously
convicted of a felony).  In Arizona v. Berger, the Arizona Supreme Court stated that
“[t]he ten-year sentence imposed for each offense is consistent with the State’s penological
goal of deterring the production and possession of child pornography.”  134 P.3d at 385. 
The court then pointed out that the defendant “knowingly gathered, preserved, and 
collected multiple images of child pornography” and “also possessed a news article 
describing a recent arrest of another person in Arizona for possession of child
pornography.”  Id. Therefore, it logically follows that even when an informed individual
was clearly not deterred, there is still a reason to sentence that person to a long prison
sentence.  See Jonathan S. Masur et al., For General Deterrence, in  CRIMINAL LAW
CONVERSATIONS, supra note 89, at 122, 123 (“[I]nstead of thinking of incapacitation
theory as a competitor to deterrence theory, it should be thought of as a supplement— 
precisely when individuals prove themselves undeterrable is when we may think it
worthwhile to incarcerate them in order to incapacitate them.”).
290. See United States v. Cunningham, 680 F. Supp. 2d 844, 853 (N.D. Ohio 2010)
(“The assertion that sentences should be reduced because it is easy to accumulate a large
number of pictures quickly also rings hollow. . . .  [T]he Court has never before seen an 
argument that because a crime is easy to commit, it should be punished less severely.”). 
291. As the court in Cunningham stated:
Robbery is certainly simplified from the criminal’s perspective by the use of a 
firearm and the choice of a feeble, elderly victim.  The Guidelines, however, do not
lessen punishment because the crime was easier to commit.  In fact, seeking 
out a vulnerable victim leads to a 2-level enhancement under the Guidelines. 
Id.
292. See id. (“The Court does not dispute that it is very likely that a defendant could 
acquire more than 600 images with just a few mouse clicks and several emails.  But that 
number of images is not collected by accident.  Instead, those images are sought out by a 
troubled mind, from like-minded individuals. Thus, a defendant makes a cognitive choice to
seek out that level of images. . . . This Court, therefore, will not alter its sentence simply
because accessing and growing a database of child pornography has become easier as 
technology has advanced.”).
293. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2G2.2(b)(2) (2010). 
294. See id. § 2G2.2(b)(4). 
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enhancement based on the age of the child portrayed is invalid because it
applies to so many defendants.295  However, a plausible reason for this
enhancement is that possessing pornographic images of prepubescent
children makes it more likely that the defendant is in fact a pedophile.296 
The criticism regarding the enhancement related to violent, sadistic, or 
masochistic conduct is that it results in a four-level increase.297  Although a
four-level increase might seem severe, this type of material is very 
damaging to the children used to create it.298  Therefore, attempting to 
decrease the demand for these horrific images by making the punishment
more severe seems logical and reasonable.299 
3.  Overreliance on Expert Testimony 
In determining the defendant’s sentence, the judge must consider the 
need to “protect the public from further crimes of the defendant.”300 
Psychological experts play a major role in determining the likelihood
that the defendant will reoffend and in the judge’s ultimate decision
regarding the length of the sentence imposed.301  In  United States v.
McElheney,302 the district court relied on expert opinions that the defendant
295. See, e.g., United States v. Hanson, 561 F. Supp. 2d 1004, 1009 (E.D. Wis. 
2008). 
296. See Seto et al., supra note 17, at 613 (finding that child pornography offenders 
are more likely to be pedophiles than those who commit contact offenses).  Pedophilia is 
defined by the American Psychiatric Association as “recurrent, intense sexually arousing 
fantasies, sexual urges, or behaviors involving sexual activity with a prepubescent child
or children.”  AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, supra note 16, at 572. 
297. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2G2.2(b)(2), (4) (2010).  A four-
level increase means that the defendant’s offense level increases by four levels.  For 
example, a defendant being sentenced for possession of child pornography has a “base
offense level” of eighteen, which results in a recommended range of twenty-seven to
thirty-three months in prison, assuming the defendant does not have a criminal record. 
Id. § 2G2.2(a), ch. 5, pt. A, sentencing tbl.  Adding a four-level enhancement would increase
the offense level to twenty-two, which results in a recommended range of forty-one to fifty-
one months of imprisonment. Id.
298. See Allen Statement, supra note 177, at 6–14 (“The demand for images fuels the
ongoing, abhorrent sexual victimization of children.”).
299. See id.; see also United States v. Cunningham, 680 F. Supp. 2d 844, 856 (N.D. 
Ohio 2010) (“[E]nd users are the cogs in the wheel that drive the demand for child
pornography.”). 
300. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(C) (2006). 
301. See, e.g., United States v. Baird, 580 F. Supp. 2d 889, 894–95 (D. Neb. 2008) 
(concluding that the defendant was not likely to reoffend and “stress[ing] the importance
of opinions of the medical professionals who . . .  have determined that he is not likely to
reoffend and is not a predator”). 
302. United States v. McElheney, 630 F. Supp. 2d 886 (E.D. Tenn. 2009). 
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was not likely to reoffend in spite of the fact that the defendant had
already reoffended after he was arrested.303  He was indicted for receiving 
approximately 3300 images of child pornography, including videos
depicting sadistic behavior, one of which was of an adult trying to
penetrate a two- or three-year-old.304  Nevertheless, the court decided to 
impose a non-Guidelines sentence based on two factors: the unreliability
of the Guidelines and a psychosexual assessment indicating that the 
defendant was not likely to reoffend.305  Although it is certainly reasonable 
for a judge to take an expert’s recommendations into account, one could 
argue that a judge should not exclusively rely on the expert’s opinion
regarding whether the defendant is likely to reoffend when making the 
sentencing decision.306 
The defendant in United States v. Wachowiak was treated by a
psychologist before his arrest, but he stopped treatment after deciding he 
was better.307  He was caught with hundreds of images of child pornography
three days later.308  The psychological experts who testified said he was
a low risk, and the district court gave him a sentence below the range
recommended by the Guidelines.309 Unfortunately, psychological
future risk assessments have historically been very inaccurate,310 and 
there is ultimately nothing “very definitive” in terms of sexual disorders.311 
One problem is the inherent difficulty that accompanies coming up with
valid empirical evidence related to these crimes and offenders.312 
303. Id. at 887, 899, 901, 904. 
304. Id. at 899, 896–97, 904. 
305. See id. at 887. 
306. See Hansen, supra note 31, at 57 (quoting Dr. Avak Howsepian, who stated 
that “[t]here’s nothing very definitive when it comes to sexual disorders, especially sexual
disorders involving children”).  See generally Grant H. Morris et al., Assessing Competency 
Competently: Toward a Rational Standard for Competency-To-Stand-Trial Assessments, 
32 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 231, 243 (2004) (“[T]rial court judges should not be 
allowed to relinquish to mental health professionals their responsibility for deciding the 
defendant’s competency to stand trial.”).
307. United States v. Wachowiak, 412 F. Supp. 2d 958, 960–61 (E.D. Wis. 2006), 
aff’d, 496 F.3d 744 (7th Cir. 2007). 
308. Id. at 961. 
309. See id. at 961, 966. 
310. See Terence W. Campbell, Sexual Predator Evaluations and Phrenology:
Considering Issues of Evidentiary Reliability, 18 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 111, 128 (2000). 
 311. Hansen, supra note 31, at 57 (quoting Dr. Avak Howsepian, who stated that 
“[t]here’s nothing very definitive when it comes to sexual disorders, especially sexual
disorders involving children”). 
312. See Michael L. Bourke & Andres E. Hernandez, The ‘Butner Study’ Redux: A 
Report of the Incidence of Hands-On Child Victimization by Child Pornography 
Offenders, 24 J. FAM. VIOLENCE 183, 184 (2009) (“The dearth of empirical knowledge 
about this population not only has challenged law enforcement and criminal justice officials,
but also has hampered mental health professionals.  For example, at the present time, there are
no evidence-based protocols to guide the assessment and treatment of these offenders.”).
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Additionally, recidivism rates could be majorly skewed due to the fact 
that child molestation is an underreported crime.313 
Some people say that the evidence available suggests that possessing 
child pornography is not a strong indicator that the person will commit 
contact offenses in the future if other risk factors are not present.314 
Nevertheless, some studies indicate quite the opposite.315  One study 
conducted in a federal prison found that most of the participants—men
convicted of child pornography offenses who initially claimed to have 
never committed a contact offense—had in fact committed a hands-on 
offense against a child.316 
Possession of child pornography has also been found to be a precursor
to future acts against children.317  One study indicates that commission 
of child pornography offenses is a valid indicator of pedophilia even if
the individual has not been previously convicted of a contact offense 
against a child.318  Another study suggests that child pornography offenders
are actually more likely to be pedophiles than offenders previously
convicted of contact offenses.319  The reason might be due to the fact that
some people who victimize children are not actually sexually attracted to
them but rather engage in these offenses as a result of psychological 
313. See R. Brooks Whitehead, Good for More than Just Driving Directions: GPS
Helps Protect Californians from Recidivist Sex Offenders, 38 MCGEORGE L. REV. 265, 
267–68 (2007) (discussing how all sex offenses are “vastly underreported” and sex 
offenses related to children are no exception); see also United States v. Pugh, 515 F.3d 
1179, 1201 (11th Cir. 2008) (“As Congress has found and as we have discussed, child 
sex offenders have appalling rates of recidivism and their crimes are under-reported.”). 
314. See Hansen, supra note 31, at 57–58; see also Stabenow, supra note 272, at 30 
(stating that new studies—no citations are given—indicate that child pornography defendants
are less dangerous than previously believed). 
315. See Bourke & Hernandez, supra note 312, at 187–88; Seto et al., supra note 
17, at 613–14. 
316. See Bourke & Hernandez, supra note 312, at 185, 187–88.  For a criticism of 
the studies conducted at the Federal Correctional Institution in Butner, North Carolina,
see Melissa Hamilton, The Efficacy of Severe Child Pornography Sentencing: Empirical 
Validity or Political Rhetoric?, 22 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. (forthcoming) (manuscript at 
39–48), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1689507. 
 317. Seto et al., supra note 17, at 613. 
318. Id. at 613–14. Furthermore, as the Assistant Deputy Chief of the Child 
Exploitation and Obscenity Section of the U.S. Department of Justice noted, “you can 
talk to any prosecutor or investigator in this area and they will tell you in no uncertain 
terms that with frightening frequency, investigations of offenders for possession, receipt 
or distribution offenses ultimately uncover evidence that the offender was also abusing 
children.”  GELBER, supra note 31, at 7. 
 319. Seto et al., supra note 17, at 613. 
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problems other than pedophilia.320  It is not surprising that researchers
have found that “people are likely to choose the kind of pornography that
corresponds to their sexual interests.”321  Accordingly, “few nonpedophilic 
men would choose illegal child pornography” when there is such a large 
quantity of legal adult pornography available.322  One forensic psychiatrist
advised other practitioners who assess child pornography offenders to
“[a]void the temptation to predict that this will not happen again, even
with treatment.”323  Hopefully, experts recognize the limitations in terms 
of the current state of knowledge because the risk assessments they provide
have a major impact on the sentence a defendant ultimately receives.324 
V. RECOMMENDATION: AMENDING THE FEDERAL CHILD 
PORNOGRAPHY STATUTES 
Congress has made it very clear that child pornography is a serious
offense that warrants serious punishment.325  Nevertheless, district court 
judges do not always punish child pornography offenders harshly, and
due to the applicable standard of review, appellate courts generally must 
defer to the district court’s decision.326  Many judges have indicated that
the child pornography Guidelines are not worthy of deference because 
they are the result of congressional mandates as opposed to empirical
studies.327  Therefore, some judges will continue to categorically reject 
the child pornography Guidelines if Congress does not take action.328 
320. See id. (“A possible explanation for this finding is that some nonpedophilic 
men victimize children sexually, such as antisocial men who are willing to pursue sexual 
gratification with girls who show some signs of sexual development but are below the 
legal age of consent.”); see also HOLMES & HOLMES, supra note 18, at 95 (discussing the 
fact that some child molesters “have deviant arousal patterns that make them sexually
attracted to children”—they are pedophiles—although for others, “child molestation may
be their way of acting out responses to nonsexual problems”). 
 321. Seto et al., supra note 17, at 613. 
322. Id.
 323. CARLA ROGERS, U.S. PSYCHIATRIC & MENTAL HEALTH CONG., PSYCHIATRY’S 
ROLE IN INTERNET CHILD PORNOGRAPHY CASES 10 (2008), http://www.cmellc.com/
psychcongress/images/08pdf/24-5%20Rodgers.pdf. 
324. See id.
325. See Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 § 217(a), 28 U.S.C. § 991 (2006); 
Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools To End the Exploitation of Children Today Act 
of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-21, §§ 401–503, 117 Stat. 650, 667–80; Child Pornography
Prevention Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 121, 110 Stat. 3009, 3009-26 to -28; 
Child Protection Restoration and Penalties Enhancement Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-
647, § 323, 104 Stat. 4816, 4818.
326. See supra Part IV.B. 
327. See supra Part IV.C.1.
Sentencing Guidelines are typically developed by the Sentencing Commission
using an empirical approach based on data about past sentencing practices. 
However, the Commission did not use this empirical approach in formulating 
the Guidelines for child pornography.  Instead, at the direction of Congress, the 
670
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In the wake of Booker and its progeny, the goal of uniformity in
sentencing has been severely compromised.329 A possible solution is a
two-phase plan that would amend the child pornography statutes.330  In 
order to ensure the amendments are the will of the people, Congress 
should engage in meaningful debate after receiving input from all relevant 
parties.  Doing so also will help avoid the criticisms expressed by some
regarding the passage of the previous amendments related to child
pornography.331 
A.  Phase 1: Creating a Statutory Minimum for Possession 
In the absence of a clear congressional mandate, some defendants 
convicted of possessing child pornography will continue to serve no time 
in prison unless Congress imposes a statutory minimum prison sentence 
for possession.332  Noncustodial sentences severely undermine the goal 
of uniformity in sentencing among the federal courts,333 and they are 
neither comparable to, nor adequate substitutes for, a period of
imprisonment.334  These sentences also put potential victims at risk,335 
Sentencing Commission has amended the Guidelines under § 2G2.2 several 
times . . . recommending harsher penalties. 
United States v. Dorvee, 616 F.3d 174, 184 (2d Cir. 2010) (citation omitted). 
328. See United States v. Shipley, 560 F. Supp. 2d 739, 744 (S.D. Iowa 2008) (“The
statute here provides a broad range of punishment for this crime, and if Congress does 
not want the courts to try and sentence individual defendants throughout that range based 
on the facts and circumstances of each case, then Congress should amend the statute . . . .”).
329. See FINAL REPORT, supra note 70, at 47. 
330. See generally 18 U.S.C. §§ 2252A, 2252 (2006 & Supp. III 2009). 
331. See, e.g., United States v. Hanson, 561 F. Supp. 2d 1004, 1009 (E.D. Wis. 
2008). 
332. See, e.g., United States v. Autery, 555 F.3d 864 (9th Cir. 2009) (affirming a 
noncustodial sentence of probation). 
333. See Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 § 217(a), 28 U.S.C. § 991 (2006) (stating
that the purpose of the Sentencing Commission—in part—is to “provide certainty and fairness 
in meeting the purposes of sentencing, avoiding unwarranted sentencing disparities among 
defendants”). 
334. See United States v. Irey, 612 F.3d 1160, 1210 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc).  Before
reversing and remanding the district court’s below-the-Guidelines-range sentence, the
court in Irey discussed why a term of supervised release, even when it includes an 
abundance of restrictions, is simply not a reasonable alternative to incarceration: 
If being on supervised release were the punitive equivalent of being in prison, 
if it served the just deserts function as well, there would be no need to put most
criminals in prison; we could put them on supervised release instead.  If the 
punitive impact of the two were the same, convicted criminals would not ask 
for a longer term of supervised release in hopes of getting a shorter term of
imprisonment.  Yet they do. . . .
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and they cannot reasonably deter defendants or other potential
offenders.336 
The Supreme Court has made it clear that Congress has the power to 
control sentencing disparities by prescribing mandatory minimums for
all crimes proved beyond a reasonable doubt to the jury or admitted to 
by the defendant.337  Mandatory minimum sentences are not prohibited
by Booker or its progeny.338  In light of the fact that some judges give
noncustodial sentences to defendants convicted of possession, Congress 
needs to amend the child pornography statutes to establish a mandatory
minimum sentence of imprisonment.339 
The same is true of the other restrictions the district court imposed, all of 
which are required or strongly recommended for all convicted sex offenders, 
such as participation in a substance abuse program and a mental health program
specializing in sex offender treatment, compliance with any state sex offender 
registration law, being subject to search based upon reasonable suspicion, and 
“the standard terms concerning risk control.”  Those release terms may be
inconvenient, annoying, and burdensome, but they are not the equivalent of 
being behind bars. If they were, no convicted sex offender would care whether he 
remained in prison or was released subject to those conditions. 
Id.
335. See Seto et al., supra note 17, at 613 (concluding that child pornography
offenders—ones never convicted of a contact offense—are more likely to be pedophiles 
than those previously convicted of contact offenses). 
336. See United States v. Goldberg, 491 F.3d 668, 671–72 (7th Cir. 2007) (noting 
that giving the defendant convicted of possessing child pornography a prison sentence of 
a single day does not reflect the seriousness of the offense, provide just punishment, 
avoid disparities, or adequately deter criminal conduct).
337. See Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 108 (2007) (“And as to the crack 
cocaine sentences in particular, we note a congressional control on disparities: possible
variations among district courts are constrained by the mandatory minimums
Congress prescribed . . . .”). 
338. See id. (noting that Congress has the power to control sentencing disparities by
creating mandatory minimums).
339. Many states have mandatory minimums in place for possession of child
pornography.  See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:81.1(E)(1) (2004 & Supp. 2009) 
(“Whoever commits the crime of pornography involving juveniles [including possession] 
shall be fined not more than ten thousand dollars and be imprisoned at hard labor for not 
less than two years or more than ten years, without benefit of parole, probation, or
suspension of sentence.”).  In Alabama, possession of child pornography is a Class C
Felony.  ALA. CODE § 13A-12-192 (LexisNexis 2005).  Therefore, the minimum 
sentence for a first time offender guilty of possession is one year and one day. Id. 
§ 13A-5-6.  Possessing or viewing child pornography is also a Class C felony in 
Arkansas, ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-27-304 (2006), which means that there is a minimum
sentence of three years. Id. § 5-4-401.  Arizona has a ten-year minimum sentence if the 
minor depicted is less than fifteen years old. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3553(C)
(2010) (“Sexual exploitation of a minor is a class 2 felony and if the minor is under
fifteen years of age it is punishable pursuant to § 13-705.”); id. § 13-705(D) (listing a 
ten-year minimum term of imprisonment for a person who is guilty of possession who 
has not been previously convicted of a felony).  Each image is a separate offense, and 
consecutive sentences are required under the statutory scheme. Arizona v. Berger, 134 
P.3d 378, 379 (Ariz. 2006).  In Mississippi, there is a five-year minimum prison
sentence for all crimes related to child pornography—including possession and
672
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There are two possible options.  The first option is to add a statutory
minimum to §§ 2252(b)(2) and 2252A(b)(2).340 Both statutes currently 
set the maximum prison sentence for possession at ten years, but they
are silent in terms of a statutory minimum.341  Congress would need to
decide the length of the mandatory minimum prison term after getting 
input from all relevant parties and engaging in meaningful congressional 
debate.  The second option is to add possession to the list of all of the
other offenses covered by the statute that have a statutory minimum of
five years of imprisonment.342  The first option, however, would allow
possession to remain distinct from other child pornography offenses.343 
Accordingly, it is the most viable option. 
B.  Phase 2: Incorporating the Advisory Guidelines     
Enhancements into the Statutes 
Although the statutory minimums certainly help avoid some disparities, 
the enhancements within the Guidelines related to specific characteristics of
the offense are currently not taken into account in the child pornography
statutes.344  The defendant in United States v. Shipley was convicted of
receiving material involving the sexual exploitation of minors in violation
of § 2252(a)(2).345  The judge acknowledged that the statute mandates a
minimum sentence of five years and a maximum sentence of twenty years
and that the Guidelines recommended 210 to 240 months, which is
approximately seventeen to twenty years.346  However, the judge sentenced
the defendant to ninety months after stating that the Guidelines were not
the result of an empirical approach, and noted that even if the Guidelines
reflect congressional intent, the Guidelines are not a statute.347  He also 
distribution—and there is also a mandatory fine of at least $50,000.  MISS. CODE ANN.
§ 97-5-35 (2005 & Supp. 2010).  Similarly, Georgia imposes a five-year minimum
for all defendants convicted of a child pornography offense.  GA. CODE ANN. § 16-
12-100(g)(1) (2007). 
340. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2252(b)(2), 2252A(b)(2) (2006). 
341. See id.
342. See id. §§ 2252(b)(1), 2252A(b)(1). 
343. Id. §§ 2252(b), 2252A(b) (setting separate statutory sentencing mandates for
defendants convicted of possession compared to all other child pornography offenses, which 
have the same statutory minimum and maximum). 
344. Id. §§ 2252, 2252A; U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2G2.2(b)(1)–(7) 
(2010). 
345. United States v. Shipley, 560 F. Supp. 2d 739, 741 (S.D. Iowa 2008). 
346. See id. at 744. 
347. Id.
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said that “if Congress does not want the courts to try and sentence 
individual defendants throughout that range based on the facts and
circumstances of each case, then Congress should amend the statute.”348 
If Congress wants the enhancements to apply to all defendants, it will
have to amend the child pornography statutes to make the advisory
enhancements mandatory in cases in which the facts warranting the
enhancement are found by a jury or admitted to by the defendant.349 
This process will create the opportunity for Congress to discuss each
individual enhancement in order to decide which enhancements truly 
warrant increasing the defendant’s sentence.  Recent judicial opinions 
should be taken into account in determining which enhancements become 
mandatory, and Congress should obtain as much input as possible.
The selected enhancements will have to change the minimum sentence 
for each offense.  This can be accomplished through an additional section in
both statutes that mandates each enhancement and provides the length by
which the defendant’s minimum sentence must increase when it applies.
For example, if Congress selects the enhancement related to material
involving a prepubescent minor,350 the statute should state that an additional 
amount of time in prison must be added to the statutory minimum when
the enhancement applies to the individual defendant.  The enhancements 
should add additional prison time to the mandatory minimum as opposed
to adding levels, which are only relevant in the context of the Guidelines.
The second phase will be more of a challenge than the first.  Congress 
will have to seriously consider which enhancements warrant a mandatory
increase—when found by the jury or admitted to by the defendant. 
Determining the additional amount of time in prison that each enhancement
selected warrants will also be challenging.  However, the alternative is to
leave the current system in place.  In the absence of congressional action, 
sentencing disparities will continue, and in some cases congressional 
intent will continue to be ignored.
348. Id.
349. In light of Booker, the statutory enhancements will only apply when the government 
proves the applicable facts beyond a reasonable doubt or when the defendant admits to
the facts necessary to apply the specific enhancement.  See United States v. Booker, 543
U.S. 220, 266–68 (2005) (Breyer, J., delivering the opinion of the Court in part) (holding that
the Guidelines violate a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial in situations in 
which the additional findings of the trial court require an enhanced sentence not 
otherwise authorized by the jury verdict).
350. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2G2.2(b)(2) (2010). 
674
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VI. CONCLUSION
Congress enacted the Sentencing Reform Act to prevent unwarranted 
disparities and overly lenient punishments.351  Uniformity in sentencing 
among the federal courts is important because it prevents disparities 
between similarly situated defendants, and it helps ensure that there is
equal justice under the law.352  Now that the Guidelines are no longer
mandatory, the disparities between similarly situated defendants have 
increased, and many defendants convicted of child pornography offenses 
receive sentences well below the Guidelines range.353 Congress should 
amend §§ 2252 and 2252A to include a mandatory minimum sentence 
for possession and to make some of the otherwise advisory enhancements
mandatory for every defendant.  Amending the child pornography statutes
will ensure that congressional intent is carried out, prevent major sentencing 
disparities, and protect children from dangerous offenders.
351. See Nagel, supra note 213, at 884 (“On the whole, sentences served were
considerably and consistently more lenient than public estimates of what ought to be the 
normative societal response.”). 
352. See supra Part IV.A.4.
353. See supra Part II.C.
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